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1. Introduction 
The effect of financing frictions on the investment decisions of firms is a long-
standing question in economics. Asymmetric information, transaction costs or agency 
problems may limit the ability of firms to pledge future expected profits to raise funding, 
making them financially constrained and unable to finance profitable investment 
opportunities. The existing empirical literature has mostly focused on how the lack of 
financing can reduce the size of total physical investment (Hubbard, 1998). More 
generally, however, financing constraints distort any intertemporal decision that has cash 
flow implications by favoring projects that generate more cash or save costs in the short 
term (see, for example, Eisfeldt and Rampini, 2006). This type of trade-off is also relevant 
for many labor-related decisions that involve paying an upfront cost to improve the future 
expected productivity of the workforce, such as searching, screening, training, and firing. 
The objective of the paper is to study how financing constraints affect the firing 
decisions of firms. In particular, we argue that financing constraints influence the types of 
workers who are fired across firms and have an important distortionary effect on the 
optimal allocation of employees, even when they have little effect on the total employment 
level. When deciding on which workers to fire, firms consider several factors, such as the 
current and future expected productivity and wages of a worker as well as firing and hiring 
costs. A firm may, for instance, be indifferent between firing a recently hired promising 
worker with low firing costs or a longer-tenured worker with low productivity growth but 
higher firing costs. Although all firms face similar trade-offs, financing constraints distort 
this decision, as constrained firms place more weight on current cash flows than on future 
ones.  
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To illustrate these ideas and to guide our empirical analysis, we develop a stylized 
partial equilibrium model of a firm that makes hiring and firing decisions regarding 
heterogeneous workers. Financial frictions make credit-constrained firms discount future 
cash flows more severely than unconstrained firms.	In the model, the productivity of 
workers varies during their tenures, so firms must keep replacing them to maximize 
productivity, even in the presence of firing costs. Moreover, recently hired workers have 
the potential to become more productive in the future, and therefore, their value for the 
firm includes an option component. Another key feature of the model is that wages are 
rigid and do not fully adjust to compensate for fluctuations in the productivity of workers. 
Finally, firing costs increase with workers’ tenure in the firm.  
In equilibrium, relative to normal times, a temporary negative demand shock makes it 
optimal for financially unconstrained firms to fire more long-tenured workers than short-
tenured ones because the value of recent hires depends on future growth prospects and is 
less affected by temporary drops in their profitability. In this context, financial frictions 
affect not only the overall level of firm employment but also the optimal mix of short-
tenured and long-tenured workers. More financially constrained firms have a higher 
opportunity cost of money and discount the option value of short-tenured workers more 
heavily, placing a larger weight on short-term returns. Moreover, long-tenured workers are 
less likely to be fired in constrained firms that have a higher opportunity cost of paying 
their firing costs. Finally, the higher firing hazard of short-tenured workers in constrained 
firms implies that a smaller fraction of them become long-tenured workers. As a 
consequence, the model implies the following four testable hypotheses. First, all else 
equal, the more financially constrained a firm is, the more likely it will be to fire a short-
tenured worker, and the less likely it will be to fire a long-tenured worker. Second, the 
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more financially constrained a firm, the shorter the tenure profile of its labor force. Third, 
in the event of a temporary exogenous shock that requires a reduction in employment, a 
financially unconstrained firm will fire more long-tenured workers than it would in normal 
times. Fourth, in the event of the same shock, a more financially constrained firm will fire 
relatively more short-tenured workers than a less constrained firm. These distortions 
operate through a labor demand channel and imply that financing constraints induce firms 
to fire workers with high productivity growth prospects, generating labor misallocation in 
equilibrium.  
To understand the empirical relevance of the distortions, we analyze the effects of 
financing constraints on (i) the average firing policies of firms across tenures, (ii) the 
tenure profile of the labor force, (iii) the firing policies after an exogenous negative shock, 
and (iv) the types of workers fired. We test the predictions of the model using matched 
employer-employee data from the whole active population of Sweden over two decades: 
between 1990 and 2010. We match worker information with employer information, for 
which we have extensive balance sheet and credit score data. The exceptional quantity and 
quality of information available in this data set makes it ideal for our objective.  
We measure financing constraints using well-established ratings of the population of 
Swedish firms. To match our empirical analysis with our theoretical setup, we focus on 
those firms with good ratings. Among these firms, different ratings imply heterogeneous 
access to credit and different interest rates. However, the firms in our sample are not 
financially distressed. We identify financing constraints in three different ways. First, we 
use three discrete rating categories, provided by the main rating company in Sweden, that 
measure the creditworthiness of firms. This specification captures the within-firm 
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equilibrium correlations between firing and financing constraints. Second, we use a 
regression discontinuity design (RDD) that uses the thresholds (on a continuous risk 
measure) that determine credit ratings. Small differences in an underlying continuous 
default probability measure lead to discrete changes in a public rating that have important 
consequences for the perception of the creditworthiness of the firm. Our design exploits 
this discrete change in perceived creditworthiness by comparing firms that are arbitrarily 
close to a rating boundary but are on the different side of the threshold. Finally, the 
structure of the data allows us to compare long- and short-tenured workers within a firm in 
a given year. The specification absorbs any time-varying characteristics that affect both 
types of workers within a firm. 
To identify exogenous changes in firing hazards, we use shocks to the exchange rate 
of a firm-specific basket of currencies. We construct this basket using the country 
composition of a firm’s exports at the beginning of the sample period.  
Our analysis concentrates on comparing the firing of short-tenured workers – who, on 
average, have steeper productivity profiles and lower firing costs – with that of long-
tenured workers. We first show that, on average, financially constrained firms employ 
more short-tenured workers than unconstrained firms. Second, after suffering an exchange 
rate appreciation shock, both constrained and unconstrained firms are more likely to fire 
workers. Importantly, however, we find significant differences in the types of workers 
fired across firms. On the one hand, the shock causes more firing of long-tenured workers 
in unconstrained firms, relative to normal times. The model predicts such behavior as a 
positive reallocation effect of temporary negative shocks, during which unconstrained 
firms fire the least efficient long-term workers and are more likely to keep short-term 
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workers with more productivity growth potential. We perform additional robustness checks 
using a measure of expected productivity growth at the worker level that confirms this 
interpretation. On the other hand, constrained firms that suffer a negative shock fire more 
short-tenured than long-tenured workers, in comparison to financially unconstrained firms. 
Taken together, these results imply that financial frictions not only reduce the job stability 
of short-tenured workers but also generate an inefficient allocation of workers across firms 
and over time.  
Quantitatively, we find that small exogenous changes in financing frictions generate 
potentially large distortions in the form of excessive firings of short-tenured workers. 
When we identify differences in financial frictions using the boundary between the two 
highest credit rating categories, we find that an increase in the cost of external financing of 
0.15 percentage points implies that following an exogenous appreciation shock, the 
likelihood of being fired for short-tenured workers increases by approximately 10% 
relative to the average firing probability.  
Finally, constructing empirical measures of the average productivity and expected 
productivity growth of workers, we provide direct evidence that these firing decisions of 
constrained firms are inefficient because they involve workers with relatively higher 
expected productivity growth than the workers fired by unconstrained firms. 
 Overall, the results are consistent with our analytical predictions and highlight an 
important – but relatively unexplored – form of misallocation: Financially constrained 
firms fire short-tenured workers with high skills and positive productivity growth 
prospects, who would be retained by less constrained firms.  
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We believe that the results of the paper can be easily extrapolated to other labor 
market settings. In any dual labor market, with fixed-term and permanent workers, or in a 
labor market where severance payments increase with tenure, the studied effects are likely 
to be relevant and very strong. Moreover, even in the absence of regulatory frictions or 
severance pay, the interaction between financing constraints and worker productivity 
growing with tenure would generate the same results. Therefore, the main effects identified 
in the paper are generally applicable to most labor markets. Given that both financing 
constraints and labor frictions are, in relative terms, low in Sweden, one can interpret the 
results as a lower bound for the effect in other developed countries.  
2. Related Literature 
This paper is related to the recent empirical literature that studies the effects of 
financial frictions and financial shocks on the employment decisions of firms (see Pagano 
and Pica, 2012). Recent papers such as Chodorow-Reich (2014) for the U.S. and Bentolila, 
Jansen, Jiménez, and Ruano (2013) for Spain study the causal link from financial shocks to 
fluctuations in net employment levels, focusing on the quasi-natural experiment of the 
financial crisis.1 Our paper differs from these studies because it focuses on exogenous 
profitability shocks at the firm level rather than on aggregate financial shocks, and on their 
differential effect on constrained versus unconstrained firms. More importantly, it focuses 
on the effects on the type of workers fired and not the level of employment. 
Our theoretical model and its predictions are based on the key insight that by 
increasing the opportunity cost of capital in the short term, financial frictions reduce the 
incentive to select projects with short-run costs and long-run gains that would be attractive 
																																																													
1	See also Campello, Graham and Harvey (2010) and Almeida, Campello, Laranjeira and Weisbenner (2012).	
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in the absence of financing constraints. Other authors that use the same insights are 
Eisfeldt and Rampini (2006), who study the effect of financial frictions on the trade-off 
between the decisions to buy new or used capital. Similarly, Caggese and Cuñat (2008) 
study the effects of financial frictions on the trade-off between hiring with fixed-term or 
permanent contracts. The latter can be a useful instrument to attract more productive 
workers but comes with larger expected termination costs.2    
It is worth putting the paper in perspective with another stream of the literature that 
concentrates on the effects of financial distress on labor supply (e.g., Brown et al., 2016 
and Baghai et al., 2016). In particular, Baghai et al. (2016) use similar data of Swedish 
workers to measure workers’ voluntary departures in the three years prior to bankruptcy. In 
contrast, we measure the effects of financing constraints on labor demand and focus on 
relatively healthy firms to avoid capturing the influence of financial distress.3  
3. Analytical Framework 
In this section, we analyze a stylized model of a firm with heterogeneous workers and 
provide a set of testable predictions on the relation between financial frictions and firing 
decisions. The model focuses on the implications of the following three key features. First, 
																																																													
2	More generally, the theoretical model of this paper is related to the recent literature on financial frictions and the 
misallocation of resources across firms (see, for example, Buera, Kaboski and Shin, 2011; Caggese, and Cuñat, 2013; 
Midrigan and Xu, 2014) and on the literature on financial frictions, the dynamics of hiring and firing, and employment 
fluctuations (among others, see Wasmer and Weil, 2004; Monacelli, Quadrini, and Trigari, 2011; Petrosky-Nadeau, 2014; 
Petrosky-Nadeau and Wasmer, 2015; Caggese and Perez, 2016). 
3 This contrasts with Baghai et al. (2016), who look at firms that have filed for bankruptcy. Instead, we focus on healthy 
firms with a credit rating between 1 and 3 (see Section 4.1. for details). The yearly propensity for initiating a bankruptcy 
process for firms with a rating between 1 and 3 is 0.68% (compared with 7.09% for lower rated firms). Applying our 
additional filters reduces this likelihood to 0.35% in our sample. 
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wages are rigid and do not fully adjust to compensate for fluctuations in the productivity of 
workers. Second, recently hired workers have more upside potential than long-tenured 
workers. Third, firing costs increase with workers’ tenure in the firm. For simplicity, the 
model considers the trade-off between firing short-tenured workers vs. long-tenured 
workers regardless of their age. However, the assumption that short-tenured workers have 
steeper productivity profiles than long-tenured ones implies that the model can also be 
interpreted as predicting how financing constraints affect the firings of younger versus 
older workers. 
3.1. The model  
 Each worker produces an output equal to ஺௡೟భషഁ
ߤ, where A is firm-specific productivity, 
ߤ is worker specific productivity, ݊௧ is the number of workers, and ߚ ∈ ሺ0,1ሻ is a 
parameter capturing the elasticity of total firm output to total labor input ݊௧. A newly hired 
short-tenured worker has an initial productivity equal to ߤ௒, drawn from a uniform 
distribution [ߤ௅, ߤுሿ. Every short-tenured worker has a probability ߟ of becoming long-
tenured. 
 Conditional on becoming long-tenured, the worker draws a new productivity value, 
ߤை, from a uniform distribution [ߤ௅, ߶ߤுሿ, where ߶ ൐ 1 is the parameter that measures the 
ability of workers to become more productive as they accumulate more experience in the 
firm. This simple structure implies that while on average, workers become more 
productive with tenure, some of them may become less productive. 
 Firms can fire short-tenured workers without cost and long-tenured workers by paying 
a fixed firing cost, F>0, and they can hire new short-tenured workers by paying a fixed 
hiring cost, ݒ>0. For simplicity, we assume that the productivity of new workers is 
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observed only after the wage is decided and that the wage cannot be changed afterwards, 
and we derive the optimal decisions in the steady state, with constant interest rate r and 
firm-level productivity A. It follows that the optimal wage ݓ is constant both over time and 
across workers, and the optimal number of workers is also constant over time, i.e., ݊௧ ൌ ݊. 
Therefore, to simplify the analysis, we fix the wage ݓ, and the associated division of 
surplus between firm and workers, at an arbitrary value that can be considered a reduced-
form representation of wage bargaining. At the end of this section, we relax this 
assumption and allow the wage to partly adjust to reflect fluctuations in worker 
productivity. Note that Sweden is one of the countries with the highest wage compression 
in the world, so the assumption that wages do not fully react to worker productivity is 
particularly relevant in our empirical setting.4 
 The timing of the interaction between the firm and the workers is as follows: at the 
beginning of each period, a worker exogenously leaves a firm with probability ߜ, and the 
firm decides whether to fire workers who stay. Among continuing workers, a fraction ߟ of 
the short-tenured workers become long-tenured, while some new short-tenured workers are 
hired. Then, all workers produce and are paid a wage ݓ ൐ 0. 
Value of long-tenured workers 
 We define ܸைሺߤ௧ைሻ as the value of a long-tenured worker who is employed in the firm 
until she quits, as a function of her productivity: 
																																																													
4	In particular, wage compression guarantees that more productive workers are also more profitable for the firm. In 
countries where wages react more to individual worker productivity, the impact of worker productivity on firm profits 
should be smaller.	
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ܸைሺߤ௧ைሻ ൌ ൬ ܣ݊ଵିఉ ߤ௧
ை െ ݓ൰ ൅ ሺ1 െ ߜሻ1 ൅ ݎ ൅ ߣ ܧ௧ൣܸ
ைሺߤ௧ାଵை ሻ൧ (1) 
where ݎ is the market interest rate, and ߣ is a wedge that incorporates financial 
considerations; i.e., it is higher for more financially constrained firms. This wedge is a 
reduced-form measure of different types of financial frictions, such as higher opportunity 
costs of money caused by credit rationing, higher costs of borrowing, and higher 
bankruptcy probability. This definition of financial constraints can potentially identify both 
differences in restrictions to credit and interest rate differentials. Since our model and 
testable hypotheses are consistent with both types of frictions, we abstract from these 
considerations throughout the paper and consistently use the term financing constraints to 
refer to these rating differences. Since productivity is constant over time, ߤ௧ை ൌ ߤை, it 
follows that 
ܸைሺߤைሻ ൌ ൬ ܣ݊ଵିఉ ߤ
ை െ ݓ൰ 1 ൅ ݎ ൅ ߣߜ ൅ ݎ ൅ ߣ 
(2) 
  A short-tenured worker with current productivity ߤ௒ who has not been fired in the current 
period has the following value:  
ܸ௒ሺߤ௒ሻ ൌ ൬ ܣ݊ଵିఉ ߤ
௒ െ ݓ൰ ൅ ሺ1 െ ߜሻ1 ൅ ݎ ൅ ߣ ߟሼܧሾܸ
ைሺߤைሻሿሽ ൅ ሺ1 െ ߜሻ1 ൅ ݎ ൅ ߣ ሺ1 െ ߟሻܸ
௒ሺߤ௒ሻ (3) 
which can be simplified as follows:  
ܸ௒ሺߤ௒ሻ ൌ 1 ൅ ݎ ൅ ߣݎ ൅ ߣ ൅ ߟ ൅ ߜሺ1 െ ߟሻ ൝൬
ܣ
݊ଵିఉ ߤ
௒ െ ݓ൰ ൅ ሺ1 െ ߜሻ1 ൅ ݎ ൅ ߣ ߟሼܧሾܸ
ைሺߤைሻሿሽൡ (4) 
where the expected value conditional on becoming long-tenured, ܧሾܸைሺߤைሻሿ, is equal to 
ܧሾܸைሺߤைሻሿ ൌ ൤ ܣ݊ଵିఉ ൬
1
2߶ߤ
ு ൅ 12ߤ௠௜௡
ை ൰ െ ݓ൨ 1 ൅ ݎ ൅ ߣߜ ൅ ݎ ൅ ߣ 
(5) 
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where ߤ௠௜௡ை 	is the minimum productivity of continuing long-tenured workers, and it will be 
determined in the next section. 
3.2. Employment-level decisions 
The optimal employment level ݊ is determined by the following free entry condition: 
ܧ௧ሾܸ௒ሺߤ௒ሻሿ െ ݒ ൌ 0 (6) 
 Since ܸ௒ሺߤ௒ሻ is linear in ߤ௒, and workers are uniformly distributed across the values 
of ߤ௒, it follows that the expected value of a new short-tenured worker is   
ܧ௧ሾܸ௒ሺߤ௒ሻሿ ൌ 12ܸ
௒ሺߤுሻ ൅ 12ܸ
௒൫ߤ௠௜௡௒ ൯ (7) 
where ߤ௠௜௡௒  is the minimum productivity of a short-tenured worker to avoid being fired. 
Using equation Error!	Reference	source	not	found. to substitute ܸ௒	in Error!	Reference	
source	not	found., it is possible to derive the optimal number of workers n, which is 
inversely related to financing frictions. 
Proposition 1: ݊ is negatively related to ߣ. 
A higher value of financing frictions λ both increases the opportunity cost of hiring 
new workers,	vሺ1 ൅ r ൅ λሻ, and reduces Vଢ଼. For a formal proof, see Appendix 2. 
3.3 Firing decisions in the steady state 
 Given the free entry condition, short-tenured workers who have overly low 
productivity and have a negative value for the firm will be fired and replaced by a new 
worker such that the minimum productivity ߤ௠௜௡௒  satisfies 
ܸ௒൫ߤ௠௜௡௒ ൯ ൌ 0, (8) 
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and any short-tenured worker with productivity ߤ௒ ൏ ߤ௠௜௡௒  is fired and replaced with a new 
worker. A firm will replace a long-tenured worker if her value is negative and larger in 
absolute value than firing costs such that the minimum productivity ߤ௠௜௡ை  satisfies   
ܸை൫ߤ௠௜௡ை ൯ ൌ െܨ  (9) 
 The relation between ߤ௠௜௡ை  and ߤ௠௜௡௒  is affected by two counteracting forces. On the 
one hand, the value of a short-tenured worker benefits from the option value of becoming 
very productive in the future. From equations Error!	Reference	source	not	found., Error!	
Reference	source	not	found. and Error!	Reference	source	not	found., it immediately 
follows that ܸ௒൫ߤ௠௜௡ை ൯ ൐ ܸை൫ߤ௠௜௡ை ൯. In other words, at the productivity level ߤ௠௜௡ை , a short-
tenured worker is more valuable than a long-tenured one. The difference, ܸ௒൫ߤ௠௜௡ை ൯ െ
ܸை൫ߤ௠௜௡ை ൯, increases with the value of the parameter ߶, which measures the growth 
opportunities of short-tenured workers. If this difference is larger than firing costs ܨ,	then 
ߤ௠௜௡௒ ൏ ߤ௠௜௡ை , and the firm is more likely to fire a long-tenured than a short-tenured worker 
conditional on a given productivity level ߤ, even though the long-tenured workers are 
costlier to fire.  
 On the other hand, a higher value of financing frictions ߣ reduces the value of long-
tenured workers relative to the opportunity cost of firing, F, and reduces ߤ௠௜௡ை , meaning 
that a more financially constrained firm will less frequently fire long-tenured workers. 
Moreover, it reduces the net present value of the future productivity of short-tenured 
workers, thereby reducing their option value and increasing ߤ௠௜௡௒ . Therefore, both effects 
imply that ߤ௠௜௡௒  increases relative to ߤ௠௜௡ை . 
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Proposition 2: A more financially constrained firm is likely to fire short-tenured workers 
more frequently than a less financially constrained firm with the same profitability, A, and 
the same quality of workers.  
 See Appendix 2 for a formal proof. Taken together, the above analysis shows that 
constrained firms are likely to fire short-tenured workers more frequently than 
unconstrained firms because financial frictions reduce the option value of these workers. 
Moreover, the higher firing hazard of short-tenured workers implies that a smaller fraction 
of them become long-tenured workers, thus increasing the share of short-tenured workers. 
Conversely, long-tenured workers become more difficult to fire, which increases the 
relative share of long-tenured workers. If firing costs are relatively low, as is the case of 
Sweden, the first effect is likely to prevail; therefore, we also predict that a more 
financially constrained firm will, in equilibrium, have a younger workforce.  
3.4. Firing decisions after a shock 
 In this section, we assume that a temporary shock hits a firm at the beginning of a 
period, thereby reducing A. This reduced-form shock can be interpreted as any productivity 
or demand shock that reduces the revenues of the firm. For simplicity, we assume that this 
shock lasts only one period. The above equations imply that the value of workers decreases 
such that  ߤ௠௜௡௒  and ߤ௠௜௡ை  increase and the firm fires both some short-tenured and long-
tenured workers that period. Assuming that firing costs are relatively low and the growth 
prospects of young workers are relatively high, such that ߤ௠௜௡௒ ൏ ߤ௠௜௡ை , it follows that the 
value of short-tenured workers for a firm relies heavily on their productivity growth 
potential rather than on their current productivity. Therefore, a temporary negative 
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productivity shock affects them less than long-term workers, and ߤ௠௜௡௒  increases relatively 
less than ߤ௠௜௡ை . 
Proposition 3: Following a temporary drop in A, a financially unconstrained firm reduces 
employment by firing relatively more long-tenured workers than during normal times. 
 Proposition 3 implies that a temporary negative shock has a positive reallocation effect 
in which less productive workers—especially among those with longer tenures and fewer 
growth options—are fired across the tenure spectrum. 
Furthermore, we can study the effect of financing frictions on the mix of short-tenured 
and long-tenured workers who are fired. From equation Error!	Reference	source	not	
found., it follows that the more a firm is financially constrained, the more the value of its 
short-tenured workers is driven by current profitability ቀ ஺௡భషഁ ߤ௒ െ ݓቁ rather than by the 
option value of becoming more productive in the future, ܧሾܸைሺߤைሻሿ. Therefore, a 
temporary drop in A will have a much larger negative effect on the value of short-tenured 
workers for more financially constrained firms.  
Proposition 4: Following a temporary drop in A, the more constrained a firm is, the more 
it fires short-tenured workers rather than long-tenured workers.  
 See Appendix 2 for a formal proof. It is important to note that financial frictions 
determine these predictions, as well as the steady-state predictions, by reducing the 
expected value of short-tenured workers (option value channel), increasing the opportunity 
cost of laying off more senior workers (firing cost channel), or both channels 
simultaneously. When firms are financially constrained, both channels increase the firing 
of short-term workers in both regular and shock times. Moreover, as long as firing costs 
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are not too high, the option value channel is responsible for a higher equilibrium level of 
short-term workers in constrained firms and for the broader firing effect of financially 
unconstrained firms.  
3.5. Empirical predictions and empirical strategy 
The model described above implies the following testable predictions:  
Hypothesis 1: The more financially constrained a firm is, the more likely it  fires a short-
tenured worker, and the less likely it fires a long-tenured worker.  
Hypothesis 2: The more financially constrained a firm is, the younger the tenure profile of 
its labor force is. 
Moreover, after an exogenous shock that requires a reduction in employment:  
Hypothesis 3: A financially unconstrained firm reduces employment by firing relatively 
more long-tenured workers than it would during normal times. 
Hypothesis 4: A more financially constrained firml fires workers with shorter tenures.   
It is important to note that predictions 1, 3 and 4 relate to firm-level decisions that are 
conditional on the intensity of the financial frictions the firms face. As such, we expect 
them to hold both when we compare firms with different intensities of financial frictions 
and when we examine a single firm over different periods of time. However, prediction 2 
refers to the differential flows in and out of each tenure category as well as their long-run 
effects on the equilibrium tenure composition of the labor force. Therefore, we expect it to 
hold when we compare persistent differences in financial frictions across firms but not 
necessarily when we compare firms facing transitory shocks.  
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3.6. Firing and misallocation 
 Hypotheses 1 and 4 imply that more financially constrained firms inefficiently fire 
workers with high growth prospects who would be retained by less financially constrained 
ones. However, it is plausible that with other frictions that are not included in the model, 
financing constraints could induce firms to make better employment decisions. It is 
therefore useful to directly test the misallocation effects in financially constrained firms. 
To empirically test this effect, we relax in the model the assumption of complete wage 
compression and assume that workers are paid a wage ஺௡భషഁ ߛߤ ൅ ݓ ൐ 0, where 0 ൏ ߛ ൏ 1 
indicates the sensitivity of wages to labor productivity, and w is the fixed component. The 
per-period profit that the firm receives from the worker becomes  ஺௡భషഁ ሺ1 െ ߛሻߤ െ ݓ, but it 
does not otherwise affect the optimality conditions of the model or the four previous 
hypotheses. This assumption implies that more productive workers are paid more, but they 
are also more profitable for the firm. Importantly, assuming that ߛ is greater than zero 
allows us to identify, in the empirical section, both different productivity levels across 
workers and their expected productivity growth using worker-level wage estimation 
models. Therefore, we are able to directly verify the misallocation consequences of the 
firing decisions of firms.  
4. Data and Descriptive Statistics 
This section describes the data set, and Section 5 describes the empirical strategy. A 
detailed list of all the variables used in the analysis and how they are constructed is 
reported in the External Appendix. 
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4.1. Firm data 
We test our hypotheses using matched employer-employee data of the universe of 
Swedish firms available for the 1998-2010 period from the Swedish Companies 
Registration Office (Bolagsverket), processed by the private data vendor PAR/Bisnode. 
The data include balance sheets and income statements of all Swedish limited liability 
companies (Aktiebolaget or AB). 
We obtain rating information from UC AB, a rating agency owned by the largest four 
banks in Sweden. It provides yearly, automated credit reports on all enterprises registered 
in Sweden. Each report provides a discrete rating, commercially called a “credit score”. 
Credit scores range from 1 (least constrained) to 5 (most constrained). These discrete 
ratings are based on a continuous measure, “Risk Forecast”, of the annual probability of 
default of the firm. Discrete thresholds of the continuous measure determine the 5 discrete 
ratings.5 The average (median) rating throughout the whole population of firms is 1.97 (2), 
suggesting that the firms in our sample are relatively unconstrained on average. The 
sample of credit ratings as well as its underlying continuous default probability are 
available for the 2001-2011 period. 
International trade data are provided by Statistics Sweden and contain value 
information by trade type (import/export), product (8-digit classification), and country for 
each organization between 2000 and 2011. In terms of volume, the largest export markets 
are Germany (10.2%), the USA (9.4%), Norway (9.0%), Great Britain (7.7%), Denmark 
(6.0%), and Finland (5.3%). This diverse distribution of export markets is favorable for our 
																																																													
5 In the original UC AB data, 1 corresponds to “most constrained” and 5 to “least constrained”. We have reversed the 
order for our empirical analysis such that a higher number indicates higher financing constraints throughout the paper. 
The thresholds on the risk score are 0.245%, 0.745%, 3.045%, and 8.045% and are determined by UC AB. 
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purpose as they are located in different currency zones. We use these data to construct 
empirical measures of firm-specific exchange rate movements. We follow Park et al. 
(2010) and construct a weighted exchange rate, Shock Index, with respect to a basket of 
currencies to which companies are exposed. There is some independent variation across 
currencies, so different combinations of trading partners may imply that appreciations and 
depreciations of the firm-specific baskets coexist in a given year. Note that even though the 
export-based weights are kept constant throughout the sample, the Shock Index varies at a 
firm-year level.  
To include a firm in our sample, we impose the following additional requirements: i) 
the firm employs at least 10 workers, ii) the firm appears for at least 5 consecutive years in 
our sample, and iii) the yearly workforce growth is restricted to be within -50% and +50%.  
Our final firm sample consists of 97,607 firm-year observations of 13,852 unique 
firms. On average, we have approximately 9,000 firms per year. The distribution of firm-
years over our sample period of 11 years between 2001 and 2011 is relatively balanced 
over time with a minimum of 6.45% of all observations in 2001 and a maximum of 
10.75% in 2007. The average age of firms is approximately 13 years. The mean (median) 
employment is 102 (27) workers. The average annual growth rate of companies’ labor 
force is 1.0%. A fraction of 34% of the workforce has been with the firms for less than 
three years on average.  
4.2. Worker data 
Our basic sample is the “longitudinal integration database for health insurance and 
labor market studies” (LISA) provided by Statistics Sweden (SCB). The database holds 
annual registers since 1990 and includes all individuals 16 years of age and older who were 
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registered in Sweden as of December 31 for each year. The data set contains employment 
information such as employment status, the identity of the employer, and wages.  
Although our firm sample contains data only from 2001 onwards, we make full use of 
the whole sample period of LISA as it allows us to calculate the tenure of each worker 
more accurately and run our auxiliary wage regressions more efficiently. Applying the firm 
data requirements to the worker data results in a sample of approximately 6.9 million 
person-year observations. The average (median) worker is 39 (38) years old and male 
(66%) and has been with the firm for 3.5 years on average. Approximately 6.2% of all 
workers are fired every year. We consider a worker as fired if i) she moves to a new firm / 
no firm in the next year and ii) claims unemployment benefits in the current or in the next 
year. The firing rates vary substantially by tenure. Approximately 10.3% of short-tenured 
workers (0-2 years with the firm) but only approximately 2.8% of long-tenured workers 
are fired every year. 
5. Empirical Strategy 
The main objective of the paper is to understand the firing policies of financially 
constrained and unconstrained companies in good and bad times across types of workers. 
In this section, we provide details about how we proxy for each of these measures as well 
as the specifications used in the paper. Jointly, they determine the identification strategy of 
the paper. 
5.1. Measuring financing constraints 
We use firm ratings as a measure of financing constraints. We focus on firms with 
credit scores ranging from 1 to 3. This leaves out firms with ratings of 4 and 5, which are 
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potentially subject to financial distress.6 While distressed firms are clearly financially 
constrained, they also have characteristics that may make them undesirable for our 
analysis. In particular, they may have a very short time horizon in their investment 
decisions and strong incentives for risk-shifting through going concern. Therefore, their 
incentives to fire or restructure the workforce may be very different from those of regular 
firms outlined in our model. 
Firm ratings directly measure the likelihood of default of a company; thus, they are a 
good proxy for the availability and cost of credit for a firm. It is therefore useful to run 
regressions that use ratings directly as a measure of financing constraints. Since they are 
determined simultaneously with firm productivity, investment opportunities and current 
policies, they must be interpreted as equilibrium relations between employment policies 
and financing constraints. Hence, our first set of regressions for each specification uses the 
first three discrete ratings of UC AB as a measure of financing constraints, with and 
without including firm fixed effects. 
However, it is also useful to run regressions in which we estimate the causal effect of 
an exogenous change in financing constraints. To do so, we use two further identification 
strategies: a regression discontinuity design (RDD) and a within-firm-year estimator.  
The structure of our data (worker-year panel) allows us to make use of a within-firm-
year estimator. We saturate the model with firm-year dummies and measure financing 
constraints using the discrete credit rating variable. This specification absorbs any common 
additive variation across worker types that is firm-year-specific. We therefore measure the 
																																																													
6 While the yearly likelihood of initiating a bankruptcy process is 0.68% for firms with a credit rating between 1 and 3, 
this likelihood increases to 7.09% for firms rated 4 or 5. 
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differential effect of financing constraints across different types of workers (long-tenured 
and short-tenured) for a given firm in a given year and compare this difference across 
different levels of financing constraints. This is an appealing specification, as many firm 
policies and characteristics are common to all types of workers. 
In the RDD approach, we use the continuous risk forecast as the running variable of 
our analysis and the two boundaries between the first three ratings as the thresholds of our 
analysis. The RDD approach relies on two main assumptions. First, we assume that, 
asymptotically, the only source of heterogeneity is the running variable. That is, two firms 
with the same continuous risk forecast can be different, but asymptotically, they can be 
treated as being sampled from the same population of firms. Second, we assume that there 
is a discrete jump in the perception of financiers when a firm crosses a rating (credit score) 
threshold. In other words, ratings cause financing constraints in addition to being affected 
by financing constraints. We discuss the validity of these two assumptions in the following 
paragraph and present some evidence in Appendix 1. The first assumption implies, as a 
corollary, that the assignment to the running variable around a rating threshold is 
continuous and, in particular, that firms are not able to manipulate their risk forecast with 
precision near a credit score boundary. Several characteristics of the credit score support 
this assumption. First, the inter-annual variation in the running variable is quite large and it 
is hard for firms to predict with precision their continuous risk forecast. The within-firm 
standard deviation of the running variable (risk forecast) for the whole population of 
Swedish firms is 2.3%, and the average inter-annual absolute change of the risk score is 
1.7%. This variation is quite large when compared with the thresholds that determine the 
discrete ratings, which are 0.25%, and 0.75%. Second, firms often change their credit 
rating from year to year. This implies that it is hard for firms to predict with enough 
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precision their risk score in advance and to manipulate their risk score around the 
discontinuity (for details, see Tables A1 and A2 in Appendix 1). Finally, it is also worth 
noting that UC AB’s rating is an absolute rating that adjusts to the business cycle to make 
the default probabilities valid at any given point in time (Jacobson and Lindé, 2000). This 
implies that even if a firm’s balance sheet does not change much from one year to the next, 
its risk forecast and credit rating can still change.  
In Figure A1, we show the density of firms around the discontinuity for the two 
boundaries analyzed. While the overall distribution of firms seems to reflect that firms are 
trying to belong to the higher categories, there does not seem to be evidence of 
manipulation on a narrow band around the discontinuity threshold. 
The second assumption requires not only that the discrete “credit scores” reflect the 
financial health of the firm but also that exogenous changes in the “credit scores” cause 
changes in the availability and cost of credit for the firm. This is a reasonable assumption, 
as the discrete credit scores are observable to many agents, while the continuous risk 
forecast is available only to subscribers to the rating services. This is particularly relevant 
for the three first ratings, which are associated with three public certifications that firms 
can request and put physically in their businesses and electronically on their web pages. 
The three categories correspond to a gold badge for “highest creditworthiness”, a silver 
badge for “high creditworthiness”, and a bronze badge for “creditworthy”. This form of 
public certification implies that these discrete categories may have important consequences 
for the availability of credit for firms. As a consequence, some financiers may also have 
rules that allow/preclude giving credit to firms depending on their credit score. The Central 
Bank of Sweden (Riksbank) explicitly reports that its risk assessments of aggregate default 
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corporate risk are based on the discrete ratings provided by UC AB (Jacobson and Lindé, 
2000).  
Table A3 shows an additional specification check for both assumptions. We perform 
RDD regressions on contemporaneous and lead effects in which the dependent variables 
are leverage, the interest rate paid to financial institutions, and the total interest rate paid. 
The results in Panels B and C show that firms at the threshold are indistinguishable in 
terms of their characteristics in the previous years (thus supporting the first assumption). 
However, Panel A shows that they differ in their contemporaneous leverage and cost of 
debt variables (lending support to the second assumption). In particular, firms seem to have 
lower leverage once they become constrained (Columns 1 to 6) and higher bank interest 
rates (Columns 7-9). These estimated coefficients have all the expected signs and are 
statistically significant in some of the models, especially regarding the threshold between 
ratings 2 and 3. Overall, these results show that firms are ex-ante comparable at the rating 
threshold but that the threshold has some impact on their financial outcomes.   
5.2. Measuring firm shocks 
We construct empirical measures of negative shocks at the firm level that might 
induce firms to fire workers. We focus on firm-specific exchange rate shocks that hurt the 
export market of each firm. We use the weighted exchange rate Shock Index to construct an 
employment shock variable Shock (large), which captures observations within the 20% 
highest appreciation quantile within a year but also in the 50% highest appreciation 
quantile for the whole sample in all years. These employment shocks are determined by 
large appreciations of the Swedish Krona, with respect to the basket of representative 
currencies of a given firm. A sudden appreciation of the Krona makes the firm temporarily 
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less competitive and may force the firm to lay off some workers and restructure 
production. 
In our empirical analysis, we use Shock (large) as our preferred measure of exogenous 
shock because smaller shocks are likely to be absorbed on other margins (e.g., hours 
worked, inventories, prices, or domestic sales). Nonetheless, we use an alternative measure 
Shock (small) as a robustness check that captures observations within the 20% highest 
appreciation quantile within a year (see the External Appendix and Table EA3). 
Table 1, Panel A shows that approximately 21% of firms are hit by an exchange rate 
shock by year. When we impose the additional condition that the shock must also be above 
the median across all years, this number declines to 13% on average.  
5.3. Measuring tenure and firing 
One of the assumptions of the model in Section 3 is that firing costs are higher for 
long-tenured workers. Swedish employment protection law indeed establishes that when 
firing workers because of “shortage of work”, a firm must i) give a notice period of 1 
month, which increases by one month every two years of tenure, up to a maximum of six 
months, and ii) fire according to a last-in-first-out (LIFO) rule within a given job role, 
which applies to all firms larger than ten employees. To retain a valuable newly hired 
worker, firms can circumvent the LIFO rule by using a narrow definition of the specific 
task to which the LIFO rule applies or by proposing a severance package to the protected 
workers or the unions (von Below and Thoursie, 2010). Firms can also fire workers outside 
the LIFO rule and pay an “unfair dismissal compensation”, which grows with tenure. For 
example, it is 16 months of salary for a worker with 5 years of tenure and 32 months for a 
worker with 10 years of tenure (Ius Labori, 2011). This outside option increases the 
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bargaining power of workers as they accumulate tenure. Therefore, rather than being a 
constraint, the LIFO rule acts as a default policy from which it is feasible, but costly, to 
deviate. More specifically, the rule clearly tends to increase the costs of firing more senior 
workers, as does the tenure-specific notice period. 
We measure the tenure (in years) of each worker in a given firm. We then create an 
indicator dummy Short-tenured that takes the value one if the worker has been working for 
the company for less than two full years. We choose a two-year definition to split between 
short-tenured and long-tenured contracts to match the duration of temporary contracts in 
Sweden. These can last for up to two years, so firing costs are convex at this threshold. 
Additionally, all Swedish employment contracts include a six-month trial period that 
entails a discrete jump in firing costs; however, given that we have only annual 
information, it is difficult to precisely define a tenure variable using this threshold. More 
generally, as explained above, the Swedish labor regulation entails that firing costs are 
monotonically growing and concave with respect to tenure. Skill acquisition within the 
firm is also likely to be convex and most pronounced in the first years of experience of 
workers. In Table EA6 in the External Appendix, we show that the results are qualitatively 
robust to using a tenure threshold of one or three years. 
Unfortunately, there is no direct measure of firing in the data. The richness of the data, 
however, allows us to approximate firing quite precisely. We define a Fired dummy that is 
equal to one if a worker is becoming unemployed or if she changes jobs but receives 
unemployment benefits during the year of the transition. By imposing these restrictions, 
we aim to separate voluntary turnover from firing. Potentially, some of the fired workers in 
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our sample leave voluntarily.7 This can add some noise to our estimations and attenuate 
our results. Depending on the correlation between voluntary leaves, firings and financing 
constraints, the voluntary leaves could also potentially bias our results. To explore this 
possibility, in a robustness check, we use more stringent definitions of firing, confirming 
all the results (see Table EA5). We also run regressions in which the dependent variable is 
voluntary leaves, defined as workers who switch from one firm to another without 
spending time unemployed. The results (reported in Table 4) are reversed for the main 
variables of interest in this alternative specification. These two sets of results indicate that 
if we have some voluntary leaves misclassified as firings, they are likely to bias our results 
downwards.  
Panel B of Table 1 shows an average tenure of 3.5 years. Note that the date when a 
worker joins the firm is not recorded in the data, so we measure in-sample tenure; 
therefore, we cannot identify very long-tenure workers (those joining before 1990). 
However, given our definition of tenure (short vs. long-tenured) and the starting year of 
2001 in our employment data, this data limitation is not a concern in our setting. The 
yearly turnover rate is between 16% and 18%. When we restrict turnovers to cases that can 
clearly be identified as firings (see above), this rate declines to 6.2%. 
5.4. Specifications 
5.4.1. Firm-level regressions 
Consider the following firm-level specification: 
																																																													
7	As a rule, workers in Sweden can access unemployment benefits if, during the previous year, they have worked at least 
six months and at least 80 hours per calendar month.	
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y୤୲ ൌ α ൅ θShock୤୲ିଵ ൅ βଵሺC୤୲ ∗ Shock୤୲ିଵሻ ൅ βଶC୤୲ ൅ ε୤୲ (10) 
In this specification, the dependent variable is the fraction of short-tenured workers 
employed at the firm or other outcome variables related to employment or firm 
characteristics, such as the average skill level of workers or their expected wage profile. 
Shock୤୲ିଵ is a firm-level appreciation shock lagged one period, and C୤୲ is a measure of 
financing constraints based on the firm credit ratings. In most specifications, C୤୲ takes 
value 1 if the firm belongs to rating 1 (gold badge), value 2 if the firm belongs to rating 2 
(silver badge) and value 3 if the firm belongs to rating 3 (bronze badge).  
5.4.2. Worker-level regressions 
We also use worker-level data in which each observation is measured at worker (i), 
firm (f), and year (t) levels. The following is the worker-level regression with double 
interaction: 
ݕ௜௙௧ ൌ ߙ ൅ ߠ݄ܵ݋ܿ݇௙௧ିଵ ൅ ߚଵܥ௙௧݄ܵ݋ܿ݇௙௧ିଵ ൅ ߚଶܥ௙௧ ൅ ߝ௜௧ (11)  
where ݕ௜௙௧ is a proxy for a worker being fired that measures whether the worker 
involuntarily leaves the firm in the period between t and t+1. We would like to estimate 
this relation for workers of long and short tenure inside the firm. To compare the 
coefficients across the different types of workers, we run a nested fully interacted version 
of the regression. 
The fully interacted version of the regression is as follows: 
ݕ௜௙௧ ൌ ߙ ൅ ߚଵ݄ܵ݋ܿ݇௙௧ିଵ ൅ ߚଶ݄ܵ݋ݎݐ_ݐ݁݊ݑݎ݁݀௜௧ ൅ ߚଷܥ௙௧ ൅ ߚସሺܥ௝,௙ ∗ ݄ܵ݋ܿ݇௙௧ିଵሻ 
൅ߚହሺ݄ܵ݋ݎݐ_ݐ݁݊ݑݎ݁݀௜௧ ∗ ݄ܵ݋ܿ݇௙௧ିଵ ൅ ߚ଺ܥ௙௧݄ܵ݋ݎݐ_ݐ݁݊ݑݎ݁݀௜௧ ∗ ݄ܵ݋ܿ݇௙௧ିଵ ൅ ߝ௜௧ 
(12) 
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where ݄ܵ݋ݎݐ_ݐ݁݊ݑݎ݁݀௜௧ is a dummy variable equal to one if the worker has two or fewer 
years of tenure. The estimation can be interpreted as a linear probability model of the 
likelihood of being fired. We pool all the years of each worker, so the results can be 
interpreted as a proportional hazard.  
5.4.3. Identification strategy 
We use three different sets of regression specifications for both firm-level and worker-
level analysis.  
The first specification includes firm fixed effects and sector-year fixed effects; i.e., 
firm-level regression takes the following form: 
y୤୲ ൌ α ൅ ߜ௙ ൅ ߛ௦௧ ൅ βଵShock୤୲ିଵ ൅ βଶሺC୤୲ ∗ Shock୤୲ିଵሻ ൅ βଷC୤୲ ൅ ε୤୲  (13) 
where ߜ௙ is a firm fixed effect, and ߛ௦௧	is a sector-year fixed effect. Similarly, the worker-
level specification is equivalent to (13) with the same additional terms. 
The effect in both specifications is identified within firm, net of any aggregate sector 
variation over time. Therefore, in this specification, any time-invariant characteristics of 
the firm or time-varying sector conditions that enter the firing decision in an additive way 
are absorbed. 
The second specification takes advantage of the discrete nature of the credit ratings 
and estimates the effect of financing constraints at the boundaries of the discrete ratings. In 
the firm-level regressions, we include as additional control variables a polynomial of order 
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12 on the continuous credit score variable ܲሺݎ݅ݏ݇	݂݋ݎ݁ܿܽݏݐሻ. The firm-level specification 
therefore becomes8 
y୤୲ ൌ α ൅ ߜ௙ ൅ ߛ௦௧ ൅ ܲሺݎ݅ݏ݇	݂݋ݎ݁ܿܽݏݐሻ ൅ βଵShock୤୲ିଵ ൅ βଶሺC୤୲ ∗ Shock୤୲ିଵሻ ൅ βଷC୤୲ ൅ ε୤୲	(14) 
The polynomial ܲሺݎ݅ݏ݇	݂݋ݎ݁ܿܽݏݐሻ absorbs any continuous relation between financing 
constraints and the outcome variable, so βଶ and βଷ only capture discrete changes at the 
rating boundaries. The analogous specification at the worker level is  
ݕ௜௙௧ ൌ ߙ ൅ ߜ௙ ൅ ߛ௦௧ ൅ ܲሺݎ݅ݏ݇	݂݋ݎ݁ܿܽݏݐሻ ൅ βଵ݄ܵ݋ܿ݇௙௧ିଵ ൅ ߚଶ݄ܵ݋ݎݐ_ݐ݁݊ݑݎ݁݀௜௧ ൅
	ߚଷܥ௙௧ ൅ ߚସሺܥ௝,௙ ∗ ݄ܵ݋ܿ݇௙௧ିଵሻ ൅	ߚହሺ݄ܵ݋ݎݐ_ݐ݁݊ݑݎ݁݀௜௧ ∗ ݄ܵ݋ܿ݇௦௧ିଵሻ ൅
ߚ଺ܥ௙௧݄ܵ݋ݎݐ_ݐ݁݊ݑݎ݁݀௜௧ ∗ ݄ܵ݋ܿ݇௙௧ିଵ ൅ ߝ௜௧  
(15) 
The effect in both specifications is therefore identified at the boundaries between two 
ratings. As discussed in Section 5.1, it is hard for firms to observe and manipulate their 
continuous credit rating with precision around a rating threshold. Hence, on a close 
boundary around the threshold, we can treat the assignment of a firm to each side of the 
threshold as random. Any potential confounding factors that are continuous at the 
threshold boundary (such as previous firing or hiring decisions) should therefore not 
participate in the identification. 
The final specification is a within-firm-year specification in which we include firm-
year fixed effects. The worker-level specification takes the following form: 
																																																													
8 The order of the polynomial needs to be high enough to capture the continuous relation between the running variable 
(risk forecast) and any confounding factor that is continuous at the rating threshold. A polynomial of order 12 is 
sufficiently flexible, although the results are robust to using polynomials in and around this order. 
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ݕ௜௙௧ ൌ ߙ ൅ ߜ௙௧ ൅ ߚଵ݄ܵ݋ݎݐ௧௘௡௨௥௘ௗ௜௧ ൅ ߚଶሺ݄ܵ݋ݎݐ௧௘௡௨௥௘ௗ௜௧ ∗ ݄ܵ݋ܿ݇௦௧ିଵ ൅ ߚଷܥ௙௧݄ܵ݋ݎݐ_ݐ݁݊ݑݎ݁݀௜௧ ∗
݄ܵ݋ܿ݇௙௧ିଵ ൅ ߝ௜௧         (16) 
The firm-year fixed effects absorb any effects that are common to both types of 
workers within the firm, even if they are time varying. The estimates of this specification 
can therefore be interpreted as ceteris paribus of any additive time-varying effects that are 
common to both types of workers. Note that firm fixed effects, sector-year fixed effects, 
the constraints variable and the shock variable are all absorbed by the firm-year fixed 
effect. For this reason, the firm-level specification cannot be estimated with firm-year fixed 
effects. Note also that the second and third specifications are nested. However, the within-
firm estimator is also nesting an RDD specification in which even time-varying 
polynomials on the running variable are used to absorb the continuous effect of the risk 
forecast variable on both types of workers. 
6. Results 
6.1. Firm-level regressions 
We start our analysis by showing firm-level regressions in which the dependent 
variable is the fraction of workers with tenure between 0 and 2 years inside the firm. The 
results in columns (1), (2), and (3) of Table 2 for the Shock variable are consistent across 
specifications and indicate that a negative export shock increases the fraction of short-
tenured workers. The effect ranges between 1.4% and 0.8% across specifications. This is a 
relatively small effect considering that the fraction of workers with tenure under two years 
is 34%. Next, the coefficient on the Constrained variable shows that financially 
constrained firms (i.e., firms with a worse rating by one grade) have on average between 
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1.5% and 4.3% more short-tenured workers. There is a consistent pattern across all six 
columns depending on the variation that identifies the coefficient. More specifically, the 
effect is quite large across firms (4.3% per rating grade), but it is economically smaller 
once we introduce firm fixed effects (1.5% per rating grade), and it becomes zero in the 
RDD specification. This suggests that the buffering of short-tenured workers is linked to 
permanent changes in the firm’s financial health, but it is less pronounced when financing 
constraints are temporary. This is also the case in our model, in which the accumulation of 
short-term workers by constrained firms is an equilibrium steady-state phenomenon. 
Finally, the results for the interaction term Shock X Rating show that constrained firms 
have fewer short-tenured workers when exposed to a negative export shock. The effect is 
between -1.4% and -0.8% per rating grade. Overall, the firm regressions suggest that in 
good times, constrained firms buffer short-tenured workers who are easier to fire in bad 
times. The results are consistent with the model, which predicts that in equilibrium, 
financially constrained firms employ more short-tenured workers on average (hypothesis 
2), and conditional on firing workers, they fire relatively more short-tenured than long-
tenured workers, compared with less financially constrained firms (hypothesis 4). These 
results are also consistent with those of Caggese and Cuñat (2008), who focus on the type 
of employment contract used in equilibrium rather than on firing policies and tenure.   
The main limitation of the firm results is that they simultaneously capture the effect of 
hiring, firing, separations, and workers accumulating tenure inside the firm. For this 
reason, in the next sets of regressions, we focus on worker-level regressions and 
specifically on firing. 
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6.2. Worker-level regressions 
In Table 3, we report worker-level regressions in which the dependent variable is a 
dummy variable that takes value 1 if a worker is fired within one year. The first set of 
specifications in columns (1) to (4) does not contain the shock variable or its interactions. 
The results are quite consistent across specifications. Short-tenured workers are more 
likely to be fired at any point in time as the estimated likelihood of being fired is 6 to 7 
percentage points higher for them. These effects are also very large in relative terms given 
an unconditional probability of being fired of 6.2% across all workers. Constrained firms 
are less likely to fire long-tenured workers than unconstrained ones in the regression with 
firm fixed effects (column 2), while the RDD specification in Column (3) shows no 
significant effect. The final result of the first four columns is that short-tenured workers are 
more likely to be fired in constrained firms. The effect is large and significant and ranges 
between 0.7% and 0.9%. Overall, these results are consistent with hypothesis 1.  
Columns (5) to (8) of Table 3 show the fully interacted specification including 
exchange rate appreciation shocks. The non-interacted coefficients follow the same pattern 
as in columns (1) to (4). The shock variable is associated with a positive and significant 
coefficient. Moreover, the interaction between shock and short tenure is negative and 
significant. In other words, when a shock hits unconstrained firms, they deviate from the 
LIFO policy and fire more long-tenured and fewer short-tenured workers relative to normal 
times, confirming Hypothesis 3. The overall effect on firing is relatively small (under 1% 
compared with a baseline firing rate of 6%). This is consistent with a temporary shock and 
the identification of over-deviations from an industry-year average. However, the 
composition of fired worker changes substantially in shock times for unconstrained firms. 
This broad firing effect of unconstrained firms may have long-term positive effects, as it 
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allows unconstrained firms to fire the least productive workers across all tenure categories. 
This effect also explains the result of the firm regressions, showing that tenure decreases 
when firms are exposed to a shock. However, the next set of coefficients shows that this 
broad firing effect is not present in financially constrained firms. 
The effect of the shock for the firing of long-tenured workers by financially 
constrained firms (the coefficient of Shock X Rating) is negative and significant. This result 
is consistent with the model predictions that the costs of firing long-term workers are 
higher for financially constrained firms. Finally, the interaction between short-tenured, 
constrained and a negative shock has a clear positive coefficient across all specifications. 
Financially constrained firms fire an abnormally large fraction of short-tenured workers 
when they face a negative shock, confirming Hypothesis 4. The effect in columns (5) to (8) 
ranges between 0.6% and 0.8%. This represents an increase of 10%-12.5% of the average 
firing probability. Taken together, the results show that in normal times, the firing rate of 
short-tenured workers is three times higher than that of long-tenured workers in 
unconstrained firms (gold badge) but five times higher in constrained firms (bronze 
badge). During shock times, the firing differential narrows down to a factor below two for 
unconstrained firms, but the convergence of firing rates is absent for constrained firms.  
The magnitude of these effects appears even more striking once put in perspective 
with the size of the financing constraints captured by the rating. Given that we focus on 
relatively healthy firms, the differences in access to credit across ratings are small. For 
example, our estimates in Table A3 in Appendix 1 show increases with the average interest 
rates paid between 0.16% and 0.30%. Alternatively, one can use, as benchmark, a risk-
neutral calculation in which lenders expect a return of 6%, a recovery rate in case of 
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default of 35%, and the average default rates for each rating category. Such an exercise 
yields differences in the average interest rates of 0.24% across gold-silver ratings and 
0.78% across silver-bronze ratings. Junior loans could have a higher rate differential due to 
lower recovery rates, but in any case, the effect is bounded between 0.37% for the gold-
silver transition and 1.21% for the silver-bronze transition when we assume zero recovery 
rates.9 Overall, the firms in our sample are financially healthy, although there are clear 
differences in the interest rates they pay that signify their different degrees of credit 
constraints. 
6.3. Robustness checks 
We run a number of robustness checks to confirm the results in the previous two 
sections. Unless otherwise specified, the results and the details of the robustness checks are 
shown in section EA2 of the External Appendix. We start with the definition of 
constrained and shock. We explore the individual rating boundaries (gold-silver and silver-
bronze) and focus on firms in which a downgrade is most surprising (those that were Gold 
for two years in a row before a downgrade). We also define the shock within a year using 
the Shock (small) variable definition. The results of these alternative specifications are 
consistent with the previous ones. 
We then move on to the Firing variable. We consider two more stringent definitions of 
firing: the first one requires as additional condition at least 180 days of unemployment. 
The second one requires a drop in income of at least 10% when leaving the job. The results 
are stronger under these stricter definitions (see Table EA5). Moreover, in Table 4, we 
look at turnovers that are likely to be voluntary. We define voluntary as a turnover in 
which a worker switches across firms and does not claim unemployment benefits in 
																																																													
9 See External Appendix 3 for related calculations. 
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between. This variable (also used in Baghai et al., 2016) should capture mostly voluntary 
leaves and very few firings. When we use this definition of voluntary turnover instead of 
firings, the main results no longer hold. The specifications with firm fixed effects in Table 
4 show that after a demand shock, in a financially unconstrained firm, short-tenured 
workers are actually more likely than long-tenured ones to voluntarily leave, thus reversing 
the positive reallocation effect found using the fired workers indicator. Moreover, the triple 
interaction coefficient is negative and significant instead of positive and significant. 
Overall, these results suggest that any misclassification of voluntary leavers as fired 
workers would actually dampen our results and is not driving them.  
We also explore alternative tenure cuts to define short-tenured and long-tenured 
workers who use either a three-year threshold to define short-tenured or definitions that 
exclude workers of less than one year of tenure from the analysis. The results are, again, 
consistent with those in the previous two sections (see Table EA6). 
The effect of exchange rate shocks is potentially heterogeneous across firms if firms 
are able to hedge their exposure through exchange rate derivatives. To rule out that this is a 
factor affecting our results, we also run regressions (Table EA7) in which we exclude firms 
with any financial assets (including derivatives). The results are robust to this exclusion. 
Note also that when firms hedge, they tend to hedge their profits directly and not their 
exports, so the marginal employment choices of hedged and non-hedged firms should be 
the same. 
7. Direct Evidence on Misallocation 
The previous section shows evidence of firing policies being distorted by the presence 
of financing constraints. In light of the model, these distortions imply labor misallocation 
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because more financially constrained firms fire an inefficiently large share of workers with 
high productivity growth prospects. However, it is possible that other frictions not covered 
by the model make financially unconstrained firms make suboptimal decisions that could 
be attenuated by the presence of financing constraints. To rule out this possibility, in this 
section, we aim to provide direct evidence of this misallocation by focusing on the quality 
of workers who are fired and retained by constrained and unconstrained firms. We assess 
the quality of workers using measures of their permanent productivity and their future 
productivity. In particular, two productivity measures are calculated from separate wage 
regressions: a worker’s predicted wage fixed effect and a worker’s expected wage growth. 
We relate these measures to the firing policies of constrained and unconstrained firms 
distinguishing between when they are in normal times and when they are experiencing 
negative shocks.   
7.1. Skill composition of fired and retained short-tenured workers 
We explore the skill composition of short-tenured workers who are fired and retained. 
We estimate a wage regression that includes a third-order polynomial on workers’ potential 
work experience (age minus six minus years of education), year and firm fixed effects as 
well as a worker fixed effect. The worker fixed effect can be interpreted as an estimate of 
the worker’s time-invariant skills (see Abowd et al., 1999). We then run follow-up 
regressions (reported in Table 5) in which the dependent variable is the average skill level 
of short-tenure workers (average worker fixed effect) who are fired or retained in a given 
year.10 The regressions follow a similar structure as the two first columns of Table 2, and it 
																																																													
10 The model has clear predictions about firms’ policies for firing short-tenured workers. The model also has predictions 
with respect to long-tenured workers, but these depend on the assumptions made about the productivity transitions 
between short-tenured and long-tenured workers. For this reason, we focus on short-tenured workers only.	
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is important to interpret both sets of results jointly, as the interpretation of the average skill 
level of fired and retained workers depends on the firing intensity of the firm. 
Columns (1) and (2) show the skill profile of short-tenured workers who are fired. The 
first observed effect is that Shock is associated with a reduction in the skills of fired short-
term workers. The effect is sizeable, decreasing the average salary fixed effect of a fired 
worker by 2.7% to 3%. The skill reduction is consistent with the results in Table 3; large 
negative shocks are used by firms to fire across the tenure spectrum. More long-tenured 
workers but fewer short-tenured workers are fired. The negative coefficient therefore 
reflects that when fewer short-tenured workers are fired, those fired have lower skills (i.e., 
are more selected). More generally, if we think of tenure as a continuum, given that the 
last-in-first-out pattern in firing is relaxed during negative shocks, we expect that the 
firms’ sorting of workers relies less on tenure and more on productivity. As the sorting of 
short-tenured workers according to their skill level becomes more pronounced, worse 
workers get fired. This broad firing effect suggests that temporary negative shocks can 
serve as a positive reallocation event in which unconstrained firms fire their less 
productive workers across the tenure spectrum.  
Next, the coefficient on Constrained is also negative and significantly different from 
zero in the regression without firm fixed effects. This reflects the average skill-level effect 
of fired workers in constrained firms relative to unconstrained firms during normal times. 
Two counteracting effects are at work here. Constrained firms during normal times have 
firing policies that are closer to a last-in-first-out rule. This would predict a positive 
coefficient (more skilled short-term workers are fired). Simultaneously, as shown in Tables 
2 and 3, constrained firms accumulate short-term workers during good times and fire more 
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of them during periods with a negative trade shock. This second effect predicts a negative 
coefficient that dominates in the cross-sectional regression in Column (1).  
Finally, the effect of Rating X Shock in Table 5 is positive and significant. This shows 
that the effects of negative export shocks on unconstrained firms are lower for mid-
constrained firms (rating 2) or are non-existent for the most constrained firms in our 
sample (rating 3). This is evidence of a misallocation effect. When hit by negative shocks, 
constrained firms are forced to fire more skilled workers in order to reduce costs arising 
from severance pay or because more skilled workers are too costly to retain, given their 
intertemporal wage profiles.  
Columns (3) and (4) of Table 5 display the analysis of stayers. In general, the 
coefficients of stayers comove with the coefficients of fired workers. The coherence of the 
coefficients on fired and stayers is consistent with firms firing workers who are less skilled 
than those whom they retain. It is also consistent with the missing category (workers who 
leave the firm voluntarily) not being highly correlated with the variables of interest. Note 
that if firms used a strict threshold strategy to fire their least able workers and there were 
no voluntary separations, the two coefficients would comove by construction. A positive 
coefficient indicates a higher firing threshold (the average worker fired is better) and a 
higher skill level of the retained worker. The interpretation of the results is similar to that 
of columns (1) and (2). For unconstrained firms exposed to a negative export shock, short-
tenured stayers tend to have a lower skill level, which is consistent with more firings of 
longer-tenured workers and fewer firings of short-tenured ones. Constrained firms tend to 
hoard more short-tenured workers in good times; hence, their average skill level is lower. 
Note, however, that this effect is large in the cross section, with a 2% wage difference 
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(column 3), but very small once we add fixed effects (0.3% wage difference, Column (4). 
This is consistent with the results in columns (2) and (5) of Table 2, which show that the 
accumulation of short-tenured workers is largely a cross-sectional phenomenon, and it is 
less prominent when we focus on temporary shocks to financing constraints. Finally, the 
main result of interest is that the interaction between negative export shocks and 
constraints is positive. As observed in Tables 2 and 3, constrained firms fire more short-
tenured workers when exposed to a negative shock, and the average quality of the workers 
who stay is higher for these firms, precisely because they are letting some of their good 
workers go. The size of the coefficient is similar to the one for unconstrained firms. This 
means that the broad firing effect that shocks have on unconstrained firms cancels out for 
mid-constrained firms (rating 2), while for firms with high constraints (rating 3), the effect 
is reversed.  
Taken jointly with the results in the previous section, the results in Table 5 show, first, 
that the skill profile of workers who are fired or stay in the firm is generally consistent with 
the use of a rule that resembles a threshold strategy within a tenure category. Second, 
unconstrained firms have a broad firing policy after negative shocks, when they fire across 
all tenures and retain more skilled workers. Finally, constrained firms deviate less from the 
LIFO policy; they fire more short-tenured workers following a negative shock, and these 
workers have higher skill levels. 
7.2. Expected productivity growth and firing of workers 
In Table 6, we explore the expected wage profiles of fired workers in constrained and 
unconstrained firms. As shown in the model, retaining workers with a steep intertemporal 
productivity profile is akin to an investment decision. Firms must maintain a currently 
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unproductive short-tenured worker as they wait for a future expected productivity increase. 
Wage compression plays a dual role in this prediction: first, wages smooth the 
intertemporal changes in worker productivity, so workers with low productivity are over-
paid with respect to their productivity, and workers with high productivity are relatively 
under-paid. Second, wages underreact to differences in worker productivity, so they are a 
good proxy of the profit that firms extract from a given worker (i.e., on average, a higher 
paid worker overcompensates for the higher wage with even higher productivity levels).  
To approach this question, we first run a regression of the three-year future wage 
growth of a worker as a function of a potential experience (age minus six minus years of 
education), demographic information and family composition (gender, number of children 
and marital status), as well as very detailed educational achievements (grades and program 
in high school and highest level of education). The model is similar to the model in 
Boehm, Metzger, and Stromberg (2016), who estimate predicted cognitive skills for the 
whole Swedish population. We estimate the model running a regression that uses 
unconstrained firms only (rating=1) to avoid a scenario in which the distortions associated 
with financing constraints introduce any biases. We then predict the wage growth for all 
workers in the sample and create a dummy variable (High wage growth) that takes value 1 
if the worker is predicted to have a wage growth above the median wage growth of the 
whole population. We include an RDD specification without fixed effects and the same 
specifications as in columns 3 and 4 of Table 3 (RDD with fixed effects and firm-year 
fixed effects). 
Columns (1) to (3) of Table 6 include only short-tenured workers, and columns (4) to 
(6) include only long-tenured workers. The results show, in the first row, that workers with 
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low productivity today (relative to their future productivity) tend to be fired more often. 
This effect is stronger for short-tenured workers: if retaining some workers (e.g., short-
tenured workers) is akin to an investment decision, it is likely that these workers get fired 
more often than those who already have a high realized productivity. This effect is 
emphasized for constrained firms, as shown by the coefficients on Rating X High wage 
growth. Given that retaining these workers is a form of investment, constrained firms fire 
them more often. The effect is substantial, as the likelihood of being fired is approximately 
10% higher per rating (i.e., 20% higher when going from gold to bronze ratings).  
The second row shows that when firms experience productivity shocks, this effect is 
attenuated, and fewer workers with high expected future wage growth are fired. Moreover, 
the coefficient of Shock is positive (in the regressions with firm fixed effects), indicating 
that more workers with low future expected wage growth are fired. This is consistent with 
the results of Table 3 and Table 5. Negative shocks are used by firms to fire more long-
tenured workers, workers with higher firing costs and workers with low future expected 
productivity growth. However, this effect is significantly attenuated for constrained firms. 
The positive coefficient of the triple interaction High wage growth X Shock (large) X 
Rating indicates that constrained firms facing a shock fire their most promising workers, in 
contrast with the firing policy of unconstrained firms. These results are consistent 
throughout the three specifications.  
The results are also consistent for both short-tenured and long-tenured workers. 
However, they are larger for short-tenured workers. This is consistent with steeper wage 
profiles, and higher option values (as defined in the model), among short-tenured workers. 
It is also consistent with firing costs being higher for long-tenured workers, making 
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productivity profiles less relevant. In the previous sections, we proxied wage profiles 
(jointly with firing costs) directly using tenure. In this section, we have direct measures of 
expected wage growth, but tenure is still likely to capture workers who are cheaper to fire 
and have higher average productivity growth rates. 
Overall, the results of this section provide independent and direct evidence of 
distortions in the firing process associated with financing constraints. These distortions in 
firing policies have real consequences as they lead to a workforce with lower productivity 
in constrained firms. 
8. Conclusions 
The paper studies the effects of financing constraints on the firing decisions of firms. 
As firing is an intertemporal decision that can be interpreted as a particular form of 
investment. It is reasonable to assume that firing decisions will be affected by the presence 
of financing constraints as well.  
We illustrate the main forces at play in a partial equilibrium dynamic stochastic model 
of a firm, which may be subject to financial frictions and makes the hiring and firing 
decisions regarding workers who are heterogeneous in their productivity paths and firing 
costs. The model predicts that financing constraints affect the types of workers who are 
fired within and across firms and have potentially important distortionary effects on the 
optimal allocation of employees, even if they have little effect on the total employment 
level.  
We estimate firing decisions at the firm and worker levels using a rich data set of 
matched employer-employee data from the whole active population of Sweden between 
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1990 and 2010. The results show that financially constrained firms i) accumulate more 
short-tenured workers as a fraction of their labor force than unconstrained firms. ii) They 
tend to fire more short-tenured workers. iii) The effect in ii) is more pronounced when 
financially constrained firms experience negative shocks. In contrast, financially 
unconstrained firms have generally a less pronounced LIFO firing policy, and this is 
particularly the case after experiencing negative shocks. Relatedly, our results regarding 
the average skills and wage profiles of fired workers show that unconstrained firms are 
more efficient in retaining good and promising workers and that they use periods of 
negative shocks to fire the least productive workers across all tenures. These creative 
destruction effects of negative shocks are absent or even reversed for constrained firms. 
Long-tenured workers are relatively more protected against firm shocks in financially 
constrained firms, as financing constraints tend to emphasize an LIFO firing policy. The 
additional firing of short-tenured workers by financially constrained firms after a shock 
accounts for an increase of approximately 7% relative to the baseline firing probability of a 
short-tenured worker. This is a sizeable effect, especially considering that we focus on 
relatively healthy firms and that dropping one rating in our sample accounts for an increase 
of up to 0.3% in marginal interest rates.    
These results uncover a novel empirical fact: financial frictions distort firm firing 
decisions towards inefficient firing of short-tenured workers. Financing constraints 
increase labor duality within firms with highly protected long-tenured workers and more 
exposed short-tenured workers, with potentially important negative consequences for the 
misallocation of resources across firms, the process of human capital accumulation and the 
career paths of young workers. More generally, we highlight the interaction between 
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financial frictions and labor market frictions and the need to study them jointly. It is likely 
that the effects that we show using Swedish data are larger in countries with higher labor 
market duality (e.g., coexistence of temporary and permanent contracts with very 
heterogeneous firing costs) and in countries where firms face poorer access to financial 
markets.  
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10. Tables 
Table 1: Summary Statistics 
This table shows summary statistics for firms (Panel A) and workers (Panel B). The sample period is 2001 – 
2010. Shock is an exchange rate shock. In “Shock (small)” the exchange rate shock is equal to one for the 
20% highest appreciation quantile within a year, and zero otherwise. Otherwise, we denote with “Shock 
(large)” the regressions in which we qualify as shocks larger appreciations, within the 20% highest 
appreciation quantile within a year, but also in the 50% highest appreciation quantile for the whole sample. 
Constrained is a categorical variable equal to 1…3 (1=best rating, 3=worst rating). Constrained 1 vs. 2 is a 
dummy that takes the value of one if the rating is 2. It is defined for firms with a rating of 1 or 2. Constrained 
2 vs. 3 is a dummy that takes the value of one if the rating is 3. It is defined for firms with a rating of 2 or 3. 
Assets (log) measures the logarithm of total assets at the end of the calendar year. Firm age is the age of the 
firm in years (the variable is calculated from worker data (LISA) and, hence, truncated at year 1990). In our 
regression specifications we create categorical variables for firm age to deal with this issue. Workforce 
denotes the number of workers that are working in a firm (calculated from LISA). Workforce growth is the 
growth of the workforce between year t and t+1 in percent. Tenure 0-2 years | fired is the fraction of fired 
workers with tenure of 0-2 years among all fired workers. Tenure 0-2 years denotes the Fraction of workers 
with tenure 0-2 years.  Sources: SCB LISA, UC AB, Bolagsverket. 
 
 
Panel A: Firm Characteristics 
 
mean p25 p50 p75 N 
Assets (log) 17.339 16.351 17.096 18.060 97597 
Firm age 13.217 10.000 14.000 17.000 97607 
Workforce 101.822 16.000 27.000 61.000 97607 
Workforce growth 0.010 -0.071 0.000 0.089 97607 
Tenure 0-2 years | fired 0.676 0.500 0.792 1.000 60958 
Fraction of workers with tenure 0-2 years 0.339 0.190 0.308 0.452 97607 
FX Shock (small) 0.213 0.000 0.000 0.000 97607 
FX Shock (large) 0.131 0.000 0.000 0.000 97607 
Constrained 1.899 1.000 2.000 3.000 97607 
Constrained 1 vs. 2 0.403 0.000 0.000 1.000 67277 
Constrained 2 vs. 3 0.528 0.000 1.000 1.000 57457 
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Panel B shows summary statistics for workers. The sample period is 1999 – 2010. Fired is a dummy variable 
that is equal to one if a worker is fired in a given year. We consider a worker as fired if i) she moves to a new 
firm / no firm in the next year and ii) claims unemployment benefits in the current or in the next year. Tenure 
denotes the number of years a worker is with a given firm. Fired conditional on short and long tenure is based 
on short tenure (0-2 years) and long tenure (3 and more years). Age is the age of the worker in years. Female 
is a variable that takes the value of 0 for men and 1 for women. Sources: SCB LISA. 
 
Panel B: Worker Characteristics 
 
mean p25 p50 p75 N 
Age 38.998 29.000 38.000 48.000 6,893,496 
Female 0.335 0.000 0.000 1.000 6,893,496 
Tenure 3.534 1.000 3.000 6.000 6,893,496 
Fired 0.062 0.000 0.000 0.000 6,893,496 
Fired | Short-tenure 0.103 0.000 0.000 0.000 3,145,526 
Fired | Long-tenure 0.028 0.000 0.000 0.000 3,747,970 
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Table 2: Financing Constraints and Workers Tenure 
The dependent variable is the fraction of young tenured workers (0-2 years with the firm). Constrained is a categorical variable equal to 1,2,3 (1=best rating, 
3=worst rating). Shock is an exchange rate shock. “Shock (large)” is equal to one for the 20% highest appreciation quantile within a year but also in the 50% 
highest appreciation quantile for the whole sample, and zero otherwise.  Specifications (1) and (4) are simple OLS regressions with industry-year dummies. 
Specifications (2)-(3) and (5)-(6) include firm fixed effects. Specifications (3) and (6) use a regression discontinuity design (RDD) with polynomials. Polynomial 
indicates a polynomial of order 12 of the running variable “risk forecast”. Sources: SCB LISA, UC AB, Bolagsverket. *** p<0.01 ** p<0.05 * p<0.1. 
 
 
                          Fraction of workers with tenure 0-2 years 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Shock (large) 0.014*** 0.008** 0.008** 
                          (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) 
Constrained                    0.043*** 0.015*** -0.003 0.042*** 0.014*** -0.004 
                          (0.001) (0.001) (0.003) (0.001) (0.001) (0.003) 
Shock (large) X Constrained  -0.014*** -0.008*** -0.008*** 
                          (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)       
Observations              97077 97077 97077 97077 97077 97077 
Polynomial on Credit Risk No No Yes No No Yes 
Industry-Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm fixed effects No Yes Yes No Yes Yes 
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Table 3: Financing Constraints and Firing 
This table estimates regressions at the worker level. The dependent variable is binary variable equal to one if the worker leaves the firm in period t and receives 
unemployment benefits afterwards, and zero otherwise. Shock (large) is an exchange rate shock. "Large" refers to shocks of larger appreciations, within the 20% 
highest appreciation quantile within a year, but also in the 50% highest appreciation quantile for the whole sample. Constrained is a categorical variable equal to 
1,2,3 (1=best rating, 3=worst rating). Short-tenured is a dummy equal to one for workers with 0 to 2 years of tenure, and zero otherwise. Polynomial indicates a 
polynomial of order 12 of the running variable “risk forecast”. Sources: SCB LISA, UC AB, Bolagsverket. *** p<0.01 ** p<0.05 * p<0.1. 
 
 
                          Fired Next Year 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Short-tenure                  0.058*** 0.060*** 0.060*** 0.066*** 0.064*** 0.064*** 0.064*** 0.070*** 
                          (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) 
Shock (large) - - - - 0.002*** 0.009*** 0.009*** - 
                          - - - - (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) - 
Short-tenure X Shock (large) - - - - -0.033*** -0.024*** -0.024*** -0.024*** 
                          - - - - (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Constrained                    0.007*** -0.003*** -0.000 - 0.007*** -0.002*** -0.000 - 
                          (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) - (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) - 
Short-tenure X Constrained 0.009*** 0.007*** 0.007*** 0.007*** 0.007*** 0.006*** 0.006*** 0.006*** 
                         (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Shock (large)=1 X Constrained  - - - - -0.000 -0.002*** -0.002*** - 
                          - - - - (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) - 
Short-tenure X Shock (large)=1 X 
Constrained - - - - 0.008*** 0.006*** 0.006*** 0.006*** 
                          - - - - (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Observations                6,887,539   6,887,539   6,887,539   6,887,539   6,887,539   6,887,539   6,887,539   6,887,539 
Polynomials No No Yes No No No Yes No 
Industry-Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm fixed effects No Firm Firm Firm-Year No Firm Firm Firm-Year 
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Table 4: Financing Constraints and Voluntary Turnover 
This table estimates regressions at the worker level. The dependent variable is binary variable equal to one 
if the worker moves between period t and t+1 to a new firm and does not receive any unemployment 
benefits, and zero otherwise. Shock (large) is an exchange rate shock. "Large" refers to shocks of larger 
appreciations, within the 20% highest appreciation quantile within a year, but also in the 50% highest 
appreciation quantile for the whole sample. Constrained is a categorical variable equal to 1,2,3 (1=best 
rating, 3=worst rating). Short-tenured is a dummy equal to one for workers with 0 to 2 years of tenure, and 
zero otherwise. Polynomial indicates a polynomial of order 12 of the running variable “risk forecast”. 
Sources: SCB LISA, UC AB, Bolagsverket. *** p<0.01 ** p<0.05 * p<0.1. 
 
 
                          Voluntary Turnover 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Short-tenure                  0.040*** 0.035*** 0.035*** 0.040*** 
                          (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Shock (large) -0.005*** -0.008*** -0.008*** - 
                          (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) - 
Short-tenure X Shock (large) -0.004*** 0.008*** 0.008*** 0.000 
                          (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) 
Constrained                    0.007*** 0.001*** 0.004*** - 
                          (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) - 
Short-tenure X Constrained 0.000 -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.002*** 
                          (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Shock (large)=1 X Constrained  0.006*** 0.008*** 0.007*** - 
                          (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) - 
Short-tenure X Shock (large)=1 X 
Constrained -0.001* -0.005*** -0.005*** -0.001 
                          (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Observations              6,887,537  6,887,537  6,887,537    6,887,537 
Polynomials No No Yes No 
Industry-Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm fixed effects No Firm Firm Firm-Year 
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Table 5: Worker Profiles. Short-tenure: Fired vs. Stayers 
The dependent variable is the average worker fixed effect of a wage regression including a third order 
polynomial on age, firm and year fixed effects averaged at a firm level for low tenured workers (0-2 years 
with the firm) that are fired or stay with the firm. Rating is a categorical variable equal to 1, 2 or 3 (1=best 
rating, 3=worst rating). Shock (large) is an exchange rate shock. "Large" refers to shocks of larger 
appreciations, within the 20% highest appreciation quantile within a year, but also in the 50% highest 
appreciation quantile for the whole sample. Sources: SCB LISA, UC AB, Bolagsverket. *** p<0.01 ** 
p<0.05 * p<0.1. 
 
 
 Worker wage fixed effect 
Fired Stayers 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Shock (large) -0.030* -0.027* -0.012** -0.015*** 
                          (0.016) (0.014) (0.005) (0.004) 
Constrained                    -0.011*** -0.006 -0.020*** -0.003*** 
                          (0.003) (0.004) (0.001) (0.001) 
Shock (large) X Constrained 0.016** 0.016** 0.010*** 0.009*** 
                          (0.008) (0.007) (0.003) (0.002) 
    
Observations              5526 5526 39184 39184 
Industry-Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm fixed effects No Yes No Yes 
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Table 6: Financing Constraints and Wage Profiles 
This table estimates regressions at the worker level. The dependent variable is a binary variable equal to one if the worker leaves the firm in period t and receives 
unemployment benefits afterwards, and zero otherwise. Specifications (1) to (3) focus on short-tenured workers and (4) to (6) on long-tenured workers. Short-tenured 
is a dummy equal to one for workers with 0 to 2 years of tenure, and zero otherwise. Long-tenured is a dummy equal to one for workers with more than 2 years of 
tenure, and zero otherwise. High wage growth takes value one if the worker is above the median predicted wage growth in a regression that uses only unconstrained 
firms. Shock (large) is an exchange rate shock. "Large" refers to shocks of larger appreciations, within the 20% highest appreciation quantile within a year, but also 
in the 50% highest appreciation quantile for the whole sample. Constrained is a categorical variable equal to 1, 2, 3.  (1=best rating, 3=worst rating).  Polynomial 
indicates a polynomial of order 12 of the running variable “risk forecast”.  Sources: SCB LISA, UC AB, Bolagsverket. *** p<0.01 ** p<0.05 * p<0.1. 
 
 
                          Fired Next Year 
Short-tenured Long-tenured 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
High wage growth  0.050*** 0.040*** 0.038*** 0.008*** 0.008*** 0.008*** 
                          (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
High wage growth  X Shock (large) -0.030*** -0.024*** -0.014*** 0.000 -0.002* -0.002** 
                          (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
High wage growth  X Constrained 0.006*** 0.004*** 0.004*** 0.004*** 0.003*** 0.003*** 
                          (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
High wage growth  X Shock (large) X 
Constrained 0.010*** 0.009*** 0.004*** -0.001 0.001 0.001* 
                          (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Shock (large)=1           -0.004*** 0.020*** - -0.000 0.005*** - 
                          (0.002) (0.002) - (0.001) (0.001) - 
Constrained                    0.004*** -0.004*** - -0.002*** -0.003*** - 
                          (0.001) (0.001) - (0.001) (0.001) - 
Shock (large) X Constrained  -0.001 -0.008*** - 0.001* -0.002*** - 
                          (0.001) (0.001) - (0.001) (0.001) - 
Observations                3,142,867    3,142,867   3,142,867    3,744,672   3,744,672    3,744,672  
Polynomials Yes Yes No Yes Yes No 
Industry-Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm fixed effects No Firm Firm-Year No Firm Firm-Year 
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A.1. RDD specification checks 
Table A1 
This table computes the mean and the median absolute inter-annual deviation of the 
continuous "risk forecast" variable for firms that are in a window of +5%/-5% observations 
of the whole sample around the thresholds that determine the discrete ratings.   
Rating boundary Gold-Silver Silver-Bronze 
Threshold Risk Forecast 0.245 0.745 
Risk forecast, annual absolute deviation on a 5% neighborhood 
Mean 0.15 0.43 
Median 0.36 0.91 
 
Table A2 
This table computes the transition probabilities across the first three rating categories. 
Transitions outside or from lower ratings are not included in the computation. 
This year's rating 
Gold Silver Bronze 
La
st 
ye
ar
's 
 ra
tin
g 
Gold 78% 18% 4% 
Silver 28% 54% 18% 
Bronze 8% 36% 56% 
 
 
Figure A1. Firm Density Around Rating Thresholds 
 
This figure represents the densities of firms around the 1-2 threshold (0.25% default probability) and the 2-3 
threshold (0.75% default probability). Mass points at rounded numbers correspond to the risk forecasts pre-
2006 that are reported in rounded numbers. The rounding is symmetric around the discontinuity and, although 
these firms are likely to identify a small part of the effect, it is useful to keep them for comparability with the 
other specifications. 
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Table A3 
The dependent variable in columns (1)-(3) is the short term banking debt to total assets ratio. The dependent variable in columns (4)-(6) is total 
banking debt to total assets. The dependent variable in columns (7)-(9) is the interest rate paid to credit institutions.  Constrained is a categorical 
variable equal to 1…3 (1=best rating, 3=worst rating) and is used in (1), (4), and (7).  Rating 1 vs. 2 is a dummy that takes the value of one if the 
rating is 2. It is defined for firms with a rating of 1 or 2 and used in specifications (2), (5), and (8). Rating 2 vs. 3 is a dummy that takes the value of 
one if the rating is 3. It is defined for firms with a rating of 2 or 3 and used in specifications (3), (6), and (9).  Polynomial indicates a polynomial of 
order 12 of the running variable “risk forecast”.  All variables are constructed as %.  *** p<0.01 ** p<0.05 * p<0.1 
 
Panel A: Contemporaneous Ratings  
 
  
Short Term Banking Debt/Total 
Assets Total Banking Debt/Total Assets Interest rate paid to credit institutions
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Constrained -0.0292 -0.171 0.156*  
(0.0409) (0.110) (0.0859)  
Constrained   -0.0116 -0.190***   -0.417 -0.200   0.0819 0.298** 
1 vs. 2 & 2 vs 3   (0.1000) (0.0710)   (0.272) (0.188)   (0.228) (0.143) 
Observations 108,789 58,982 84,319 176,543 91,620 140,453 177,100 89,035 142,573 
R-squared 0.728 0.782 0.747 0.757 0.809 0.772 0.616 0.687 0.643 
Year-Sector FE yes Yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Firm FE yes Yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Polynomial yes Yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
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Panel B: Ratings 1 year after         
Short Term Banking Debt/Total 
Assets Total Banking Debt/Total Assets Interest rate paid to credit institutions
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Constrained -0.0301 -0.0433 0.0197 
(0.0473) (0.127) (0.0853) 
Constrained   0.0108 -0.108   -0.499* -0.0553   -0.0142 3.57e-05 
1 vs. 2 & 2 vs 3   (0.108) (0.0848)   (0.287) (0.220)   (0.215) (0.149) 
Observations 65,966 41,251 48,284 113,080 67,632 85,815 113,004 65,235 87,300 
R-squared 0.772 0.811 0.794 0.787 0.828 0.803 0.655 0.710 0.684 
Year-Sector FE yes Yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Firm FE yes Yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Polynomial yes Yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
 
 
Panel C: Ratings 2 years after         
Short Term Banking Debt/Total 
Assets Total Banking Debt/Total Assets Interest rate paid to credit institutions 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Constrained 0.0455 0.0108 0.00422
(0.0577) (0.147) (0.103) 
Constrained   -0.0489 0.0231   -0.370 0.184   0.193 -0.186 
1 vs. 2 & 2 vs 3   (0.121) (0.108)   (0.310) (0.270)   (0.235) (0.182) 
Observations 46,518 31,234 32,418 83,115 53,054 60,785 83,678 51,675 62,400 
R-squared 0.787 0.824 0.813 0.802 0.840 0.819 0.668 0.724 0.700 
Year-Sector FE yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Firm FE yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Polynomial yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
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A.2. Proofs 
Proof of proposition 1 
First, we compute ߤ௠௜௡ை . From (Error! Reference source not found.) and (9) 
we obtain 	
ቀ ஺௡భషഁ ߤ௠௜௡ை െ ݓቁ
ଵ
௱ ൅ ܨ ൌ 0, where ߂ ≝
ఋା௥ାఒ
ଵା௥ାఒ. Solving we get 	
ߤ௠௜௡ை ൌ ௡
భషഁ
஺ ሾݓ െ ߂ܨሿ.  Substituting in 5 and rearranging:                
ܧሾܸைሺߤைሻሿ ൌ ଵଶ ቀ
஺
௡భషഁ ߶ߤுെݓቁ
1
߂ െ
ଵ
ଶ ܨ. 
(17)
 Therefore an increase in financing frictions ߣ lowers ܧሾܸைሺߤைሻሿ because it reduces 
the net present value of worker’s surplus (the term ଵ௱ becomes smaller).	Given the value of 
ܧሾܸைሺߤைሻሿ, recall the value of a short-term worker (4). An increase in financing fricions 
ߣ	reduces the value of a short tenured worker ܸ௒ሺߤ௒ሻ both because it reduces the option 
value of becoming long-tenured ܧሾܸைሺߤைሻሿ, and because it reduces the net present value 
of remaining short-tenured (the multiplier in front of the curly brakets also falls). 
Therefore the term ܧ௧ሾܸ௒ሺߤ௒ሻሿ  falls, and it needs to be counterbalanced by a reduction in 
n to increase the productivity of workers and reestablish the equilibrium in the free entry 
condition ܧ௧ሾܸ௒ሺߤ௒ሻሿ െ ݒ ൌ 0. 
Proof of proposition 2 
From the firing condition for young workers,	ܸ௒ሺߤ௠௜௡௒ ሻ ൌ 0, we derive ߤ௠௜௡௒ ൌ
௡భషഁ
஺ ቄݓ െ
ሺଵିఋሻ
ଵା௥ାఒ ߟܧሾܸைሺߤைሻሿቅ. From the discussion above it follows that ߤ௠௜௡௒  increases 
as ߣ increases. Moreover ߤ௠௜௡ை 	falls, because ߂ increases.  
Proof of proposition 4 
From the definitions of ߤ௠௜௡ை  and ߤ௠௜௡௒  derived above it follows that 	
డఓ೘೔೙ೊ
డ஺ ൌ െ
௡భషഁ
஺మ ቄݓ െ
ሺଵିఋሻ
ଵା௥ାఒ ߟܧሾܸைሺߤைሻሿቅ and 
డఓ೘೔೙ೀ
డ஺ ൌ െ
௡భషഁ
஺మ ሾݓ െ ߂ܨሿ. Given that 
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workers are uniformly distributed over productivities, proposition 4 is equivalent to 
saying that డఓ೘೔೙
ೊ
డ஺ െ
డఓ೘೔೙ೀ
డ஺ 	increases in ߣ. Therefore the proof follows immediately from 
the fact that ቄݓ െ ሺଵିఋሻଵା௥ାఒ ߟܧሾܸைሺߤைሻሿቅ	increases in ߣ,	while ሾݓ െ ߂ܨሿ decreases in ߣ, as 
argued before.  
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External Appendix  
EA.1. Data  
Data Universe: 
Firms: Population of Swedish firms from 1998 until 2010. Source - Swedish Companies 
Registration Office (Bolagsverket). We standardize all firm data into January to 
December fiscal years by calculating monthly flow data and aggregating or by averaging 
stock data. Restricted to firms that: i) employ least 10 workers, ii) appear at least for 5 
consecutive years in the data, and iii) with yearly workforce growth within -50% and 
+50%. 
Workers: “Longitudinal integration database for health insurance and labor market 
studies” (LISA). All individuals 16 years of age and older that were registered in Sweden 
as of December 31 for each year. 
Sectors: Data comes from SNI1992 (1990-2001), SNI2002 (2002-2010), and SNI2007 
(2011) classification. Consolidated at the SNI2002 level. 
 Ratings: Source - UC AB. Credit scores range from 1 (least constrained) to 5 (most 
constrained). Risk Forecast” measures the annual probability of default of the firm. 
Coverage from 2001 to 2011.  
International trade data: Source - Statistics Sweden. Trade type (import/export), product 
(8-digit classification), and country for each organization between 2000 and 2011. 
 
Variables: 
Tenure: Tenure of a worker with her current firm in years. 
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Fraction of workers with tenure 0-2 years: Fraction of workers with tenure below two 
years calculated at the firm-year level. 
Short tenure: Takes value one if a worker has less than two years of tenure within the 
firm and zero otherwise.  
Fired: Takes value one if a worker leaves the firm within the next year and receives 
unemployment benefits and zero otherwise. 
Voluntary turnover: Takes value one if a worker is moving to a different company and 
does not receive any unemployment benefits in the transition period. 
Firm-specific exchange rate: Exchange rate of the Swedish Krona with respect to a 
weighted basket of the representative currencies of the firm exports in 2000. 
Shock (large): Observations within the 20% highest appreciation of their firm-specific 
exchange rate quantile within a year, but also in the 50% highest appreciation quantile for 
the whole sample in all years. Specifically ݄ܵ݋ܿ݇	ܫ݊݀݁ݔ௙,௧ ൌ 	∑ ߱௙,௖,଴ ∗ ݁_݄ܿܽ݊݃݁௖,௧	௖  
where e_change is the change of exchange rate with currency c over the last year, i.e., 
݁_݄ܿܽ݊݃݁௖,௧ ൌ ln൫ܨܺ௖,௧൯ െ ln	ሺܨܺ௖,௧ିଵሻ, and ߱௙,௖,଴ are fixed export weights. 
Shock (small): Observations within the 20% highest appreciation of their firm-specific 
exchange rate quantile within a year.  
Specifically, ݄ܵ݋ܿ݇	ܫ݊݀݁ݔ௙,௧ ൌ 	∑ ߱௙,௖,଴ ∗ ݁_݄ܿܽ݊݃݁௖,௧	௖ , where e_change is the change 
of exchange rate with currency c over the last year,  
i.e., ݁_݄ܿܽ݊݃݁௖,௧ ൌ ln൫ܨܺ௖,௧൯ െ ln	ሺܨܺ௖,௧ିଵሻ, and ߱௙,௖,଴ are fixed export weights. 
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Constrained: Categorical variable 1=gold rating (best), 2=silver rating and 3=bronze 
rating (worst rating). Firms with ratings below bronze rating are excluded from the 
sample.  
Constrained 1 vs. 2 (Constrained 2 vs. 3): A dummy variable that is equal to one if the 
rating is silver and zero if the rating is gold (dummy variable that is equal to one if the 
rating is bronze and zero if the rating is silver).  
High wage growth: A dummy that takes value one if the worker is above the median 
predicted wage growth in a regression that uses only unconstrained firms with the 
independent variables age minus six minus years of education (potential experience), 
gender, number of children, marital status, grades and program in high school and highest 
level of education. 
Worker Wage Fixed Effect:  Average worker fixed effect of a wage regression including 
a third order polynomial on age, firm and year fixed effects averaged at a firm level for 
low tenured workers (0-2 years with the firm) that are fired or stay with the firm. 
 
EA.2. Robustness Checks 
In the paper, we have pooled the average effect of dropping a rating notch between 
categories 1, 2 and between 2 and 3. This increases the power to estimate the effects but 
comes at the cost of not identifying potential heterogeneous effects. In Tables EA1 and 
EA2, we perform the same regressions as in Table 3, but for the individual boundaries 
between the gold-silver categories and the silver-bronze categories. In particular, we only 
include firms with ratings 1 and 2 in Table EA1 and firms with ratings 2 and 3 in Table 
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EA2. The results are qualitatively consistent across the two individual categories. They 
are also consistent with the results in Table 3, showing that our previous results are 
identified by both boundaries.  
In quantitative terms, the effect is slightly stronger for the gold-silver threshold. This 
may be at odds with the fact that, in terms of interest rates, it is a less important threshold 
than the silver-bronze threshold. However, the gold category (equivalent to a risk free 
triple A rating in other rating systems) has more persistence than any of the other 
categories (see Table A2 in the Appendix), so being downgraded from the gold category 
may predict further future downgrades. For this reason, crossing the gold-silver boundary 
may contain more information about the long-term financial health of the firm. 
In Table EA3 we replicate the analysis in Table 3, but we redefine the shock 
variable. The shock variable takes value 1 if the firm is in the highest appreciation 
quantile within a year and zero otherwise. That is, relative to our previous shock 
definition, we drop the condition that the shock needs to be large in absolute terms and 
focus only on relative differences within the year. The main advantage of this variable is 
that it is evenly distributed across years, so it does not capture any aggregate variation of 
the exchange rate of the Swedish Krona. The results in Table EA3 are consistent with 
those in Table 3 with, as expected, slightly smaller point estimates on the Shock 
coefficients. 
In Table EA4 we perform an additional robustness check. We restrict the sample to 
firms that obtained the highest rating (“gold”) for two years in a row and focus on the 
boundary between gold and silver ratings. The rationale for this specification is that firms 
that transition from gold to silver rating for the first time are more likely to be surprised 
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to be downgraded to the silver category and, hence, less likely to “manage” their rating 
results in the short run. The results on this subpopulation are qualitatively similar to our 
previous results in Table 3. However, they are quantitatively much more sizeable 
compared to our baseline. For instance, the estimated coefficient on the triple interaction 
is between two to three times larger and more precisely estimated. In other words, the 
firms for which a change in the rating is closest to an exogenous unexpected shock are 
the ones for which the pattern of results is clearer, with larger and more significant 
coefficients. This lends support to the identification strategies of the paper. 
In Table EA5, we replace the definition of firing with stricter definitions of firing. In 
Columns 1 and 2 we require that workers are unemployed for at least 180 days between 
jobs to classify as fired. In Columns 3 and 4 we require that workers suffer a drop in 
income of at least 10% when changing jobs. The results under these stricter definitions of 
firing are stronger, relative to the baseline firing probability, than the ones in Table 3. 
In Table EA6 we replace the definition of high vs low tenured workers with 
alternative ones. In columns 1 and 2 we define as short-tenured workers those with tenure 
below one year and in columns 3 and 4 we define them as those with tenure below three 
years. In columns 5 to 8 we exclude from the analysis those workers with tenure below 
one year and define short-tenure workers as 1-2 years of tenure (columns 5 and 6) and 1-
3 years of tenure (columns 7 and 8). The results are qualitatively very consistent across 
specifications and also consistent with those in sections 6.1 and 6.2. 
The possibility of hedging could make that firms are heterogeneously exposed to the 
exchange rate shock. This could add noise and potentially biases to our regressions. There 
are some reasons to believe that this is not the case. First, our firms are relatively small 
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(median of 27 employees), and unlikely to have access to financial derivatives to hedge 
their currency exposures. Second, when firms hedge against exchange rate fluctuations, 
they typically hedge their profits directly. If they hedge their sales, exports or imports, 
they hedge a notional amount of them. Hedging the actual amount of exports would 
require a tailor made contract that would be subject to moral hazard considerations. 
Given this, the operational decisions of a hedged firm ad a non-hedged firms would be 
the same, as the price paid/received in the margin for inputs and exports is the same for 
both types of firms. To show that our results are robust to the possibility of hedging, in 
Table EA7 we run regressions in which we exclude all firms that hold financial assets. 
Although we do not have more disaggregated data that show explicitly whether a firm 
holds derivatives, most forms of currency financial hedging should show up in the firm 
accounts as part of its financial assets. The results are very similar, and marginally larger 
on those coefficients that involve the shock variable. This effect could come from the 
absence of hedging, but also from the relatively smaller size of the firms in the restricted 
sample. 
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Table EA1: Financing Constraints and Firing (Thresholds 1 and 2) 
This table estimates regressions at the worker level. The dependent variable is binary variable equal to one 
if the worker leaves the firm in period t and receives unemployment benefits afterwards, and zero 
otherwise. Shock (large) is an exchange rate shock. "Large" refers to shocks of larger appreciations, within 
the 20% highest appreciation quantile within a year, but also in the 50% highest appreciation quantile for 
the whole sample. Constrained 1 vs. 2 is a dummy that takes the value of one if the rating is 2. It is defined 
for firms with a rating of 1 or 2. Short-tenured is a dummy equal to one for workers with 0 to 2 years of 
tenure, and zero otherwise. Polynomial indicates a polynomial of order 12 of the running variable “risk 
forecast”. Sources: SCB LISA, UC AB, Bolagsverket.*** p<0.01 ** p<0.05 * p<0.1. 
 
Fired Next Year 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Short-tenure                  0.070*** 0.069*** 0.069*** 0.074*** 
                          (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Shock (large) 0.002*** 0.007*** 0.007*** - 
                          (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) - 
Short-tenure X Shock (large) -0.025*** -0.020*** -0.020*** -0.018*** 
                          (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Constrained 1 vs. 2 0.009*** -0.005*** -0.004*** - 
                          (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) - 
Short-tenure X Constrained 1 vs. 2 0.017*** 0.014*** 0.014*** 0.013*** 
                          (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Shock (large)=1 X Constrained 1 vs. 2  -0.005*** -0.001 -0.001 - 
                          (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) - 
Short-tenure X Shock (large)=1 X Constrained 1 
vs. 2 0.015*** 0.013*** 0.013*** 0.005*** 
                          (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) 
Observations                5,203,427   5,203,427   5,203,427    5,203,427 
Polynomials No No Yes No 
Industry-Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm fixed effects No Firm Firm Firm-Year 
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Table EA2: Financing Constraints and Firing (Thresholds 2 and 3) 
This table estimates regressions at the worker level. The dependent variable is binary variable equal to one 
if the worker leaves the firm in period t and receives unemployment benefits afterwards, and zero 
otherwise. Shock (large) is an exchange rate shock. "Large" refers to shocks of larger appreciations, within 
the 20% highest appreciation quantile within a year, but also in the 50% highest appreciation quantile for 
the whole sample.  Constrained 2 vs. 3 is a dummy that takes the value of one if the rating is 3. It is defined 
for firms with a rating of 2 or 3. Short-tenured is a dummy equal to one for workers with 0 to 2 years of 
tenure, and zero otherwise. Polynomial indicates a polynomial of order 12 of the running variable “risk 
forecast”. Sources: SCB LISA, UC AB, Bolagsverket. *** p<0.01 ** p<0.05 * p<0.1. 
 
                          Fired Next Year 
                          (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Short-tenure                  0.087*** 0.083*** 0.083*** 0.087*** 
                          (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Shock (large) -0.004*** 0.004*** 0.004*** - 
                          (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) - 
Short-tenure X Shock (large) -0.010*** -0.008*** -0.008*** -0.012*** 
                          (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Constrained 2 vs. 3 0.004*** 0.002*** -0.000 - 
                          (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) - 
Short-tenure X Constrained 2 vs. 3 -0.003*** -0.004*** -0.004*** -0.003*** 
                          (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Shock (large)=1 X Rating 2 vs. 3  0.007*** -0.003*** -0.003*** - 
                          (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) - 
Short-tenure X Shock (large)=1 X Constrained 2 
vs. 3 -0.004** 0.003 0.003 0.006*** 
                          (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Observations                3,003,019   3,003,019   3,003,019    3,003,019 
Polynomials No No Yes No 
Industry-Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm fixed effects No Firm Firm Firm-Year 
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Table EA3: Financing Constraints and Firing (Small Shock) 
This table estimates regressions at the worker level. The dependent variable is binary variable equal to one 
if the worker leaves the firm in period t and receives unemployment benefits afterwards, and zero 
otherwise. Shock (large) is an exchange rate shock. "Small" refers to shocks of larger appreciations, within 
the 20% highest appreciation quantile within a year.  Constrained is a categorical variable equal to 1,2,3 
(1=best rating, 3=worst rating). Short-tenured is a dummy equal to one for workers with 0 to 2 years of 
tenure, and zero otherwise. Polynomial indicates a polynomial of order 12 of the running variable “risk 
forecast”. Sources: SCB LISA, UC AB, Bolagsverket. *** p<0.01 ** p<0.05 * p<0.1. 
 
 
Fired Next Year 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Short-tenured                  0.066*** 0.066*** 0.066*** 0.072*** 
                          (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Shock (small) 0.002*** 0.010*** 0.010*** - 
                          (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) - 
Short-tenured X Shock (small) -0.027*** -0.023*** -0.022*** -0.022*** 
                          (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Constrained                    0.007*** -0.002*** 0.000 - 
                          (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) - 
Short-tenured X Constrained 0.007*** 0.005*** 0.005*** 0.005*** 
                          (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Shock (small) X Constrained  -0.001*** -0.003*** -0.003*** - 
                          (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) - 
Short-tenured X Shock (small) X 
Constrained 0.005*** 0.005*** 0.005*** 0.005*** 
                          (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Observations               6887539    6,887,539   6,887,539    6,887,539  
Polynomials No No Yes No 
Industry-Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm fixed effects No Firm Firm Firm-Year 
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Table EA4: Financing Constraints and Firing (Previous Gold Firms) 
This table estimates regressions at the worker level. We restrict the sample to firms that were categorized as 
gold rating for the previous 2 years. This table estimates regressions at the worker level. The dependent 
variable is binary variable equal to one if the worker leaves the firm in period t and receives unemployment 
benefits afterwards, and zero otherwise. Shock (large) is an exchange rate shock. "Large" refers to shocks 
of larger appreciations, within the 20% highest appreciation quantile within a year, but also in the 50% 
highest appreciation quantile for the whole sample. Constrained 1 vs. 2 is a dummy that takes the value of 
one if the rating is 2. It is defined for firms with a rating of 1 or 2. Short-tenured is a dummy equal to one 
for workers with 0 to 2 years of tenure, and zero otherwise. Polynomial indicates a polynomial of order 12 
of the running variable “risk forecast”. Sources: SCB LISA, UC AB, Bolagsverket. *** p<0.01 ** p<0.05 * 
p<0.1. 
 
 
 Fired Next Year 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Short-tenure                  0.070*** 0.069*** 0.069*** 0.073*** 
                          (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Shock (large) 0.009*** 0.022*** 0.023*** - 
                          (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) - 
Short-tenure X Shock (large) -0.058*** -0.046*** -0.046*** -0.032*** 
                          (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Constrained 1 vs. 2 0.006*** 0.002*** 0.010*** - 
                          (0.000) (0.001) (0.002) - 
Short-tenure X Constrained 1 vs. 2 -0.002** -0.000 -0.001 -0.002** 
                          (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Shock (large)=1 X Constrained 1 vs. 2  -0.007*** -0.012*** -0.013*** - 
                          (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) - 
Short-tenure X Shock (large)=1 X Constrained 
1 vs. 2 0.026*** 0.020*** 0.020*** 0.013*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Observations              
  
2,578,093    2,578,093   2,578,093  
  
2,578,093  
Polynomials No No Yes No 
Industry-Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm fixed effects No Firm Firm Firm-Year 
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Table EA5: Alternative Specifications of Firing 
This table estimates regressions at the worker level. In columns (1) and (2) the dependent variable is binary 
variable equal to 1 if the worker leaves the firm in period t and receives unemployment benefits for at least 
180 days afterwards, and zero otherwise. In columns (3) and (4) the dependent variable is binary variable 
equal to one if the worker leaves the firm in period t, receives unemployment benefits afterwards and a cut 
of her disposable income of at least 10%, and zero otherwise. Shock (large) is an exchange rate shock. 
"Large" refers to shocks of larger appreciations, within the 20% highest appreciation quantile within a year, 
but also in the 50% highest appreciation quantile for the whole sample. Constrained is a categorical 
variable equal to 1,2,3 (1=best rating, 3=worst rating). Short-tenured is a dummy equal to one for workers 
with 0 to 2 years of tenure, and zero otherwise. Polynomial indicates a polynomial of order 12 of the 
running variable “risk forecast”. Sources: SCB LISA, UC AB, Bolagsverket. *** p<0.01 ** p<0.05 * 
p<0.1. 
 
Fired Next Year 
Days unemployed > 180d Income cut > 10% 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Short-tenure                  0.019*** 0.021*** 0.031*** 0.034*** 
                          (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Shock (large) 0.006*** - 0.009*** - 
                          (0.000) - (0.000) - 
Short-tenure X Shock (large) -0.010*** -0.008*** -0.015*** -0.016*** 
                          (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Constrained                    -0.001*** - -0.001*** - 
                          (0.000) - (0.000) - 
Short-tenure X Constrained 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.001*** 0.002*** 
                          (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Shock (large)=1 X 
Constrained  -0.002*** - -0.003*** - 
                          (0.000) - (0.000) - 
Short-tenure X Shock 
(large)=1 X Constrained 0.003*** 0.002*** 0.005*** 0.005*** 
                          (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) 
Observations               6,887,539   6,887,539   6,887,539   6,887,539  
Polynomials Yes No Yes No 
Industry-Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm fixed effects Firm Firm-Year Firm Firm-Year 
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Table EA6: Alternative Specifications of Tenure 
This table estimates regressions at the worker level. The dependent variable is binary variable equal to 1 if the worker leaves the firm in period t and receives 
unemployment benefits afterwards, and zero otherwise. Shock (large) is an exchange rate shock. "Large" refers to shocks of larger appreciations, within the 20% 
highest appreciation quantile within a year, but also in the 50% highest appreciation quantile for the whole sample. Constrained is a categorical variable equal to 
1,2,3 (1=best rating, 3=worst rating). In columns (1) and (2) Short-tenured is a dummy equal to one for workers with 0 to 1 years of tenure, and zero otherwise 
(Short-tenured is 0 to 3 years in columns (3) and (4), 1 to 2 years in columns (5) and (6), and 1 to 3 years in columns (7) and (8)). We drop all workers with less 
than 2 years of tenure in specifications (5) to (8). Polynomial indicates a polynomial of order 12 of the running variable “risk forecast”. Sources: SCB LISA, UC 
AB, Bolagsverket. *** p<0.01 ** p<0.05 * p<0.1. 
 
Fired Next Year 
Short-tenure (0-1 years) Short-tenure (0-3 years) Short-tenure (1-2 years) Short-tenure (1-3 years) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Short-tenure                  0.077*** 0.083*** 0.057*** 0.062*** 0.018*** 0.023*** 0.018*** 0.021*** 
                          (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) 
Shock (large) 0.010*** - 0.013*** - 0.004*** - 0.006*** - 
                          (0.001) - (0.001) - (0.001) - (0.001) - 
Short-tenure X Shock (large) -0.027*** -0.026*** -0.017*** -0.020*** -0.009*** -0.012*** -0.005*** -0.009*** 
                          (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) 
Constrained                    -0.001 - -0.002*** - -0.001* - -0.001** - 
                          (0.001) - (0.001) - (0.001) - (0.001) - 
Short-tenure X Constrained 0.005*** 0.005*** 0.005*** 0.005*** 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.002*** 0.003*** 
                          (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Shock (large)=1 X Constrained  -0.003*** - -0.003*** - -0.001*** - -0.002*** - 
                          (0.000) - (0.000) - (0.000) - (0.000) - 
Short-tenure X Shock (large)=1 X Constrained 0.007*** 0.008*** 0.004*** 0.005*** 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.001* 0.002** 
                          (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Observations                6,887,539    6,887,539    6,887,539    6,887,539    4,599,302    4,599,302    4,599,302    4,599,302  
Exclude workers with tenure 0-1  No   No   No   No   Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes  
Polynomials Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No 
Industry-Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm fixed effects Firm Firm-Year Firm Firm-Year Firm Firm-Year Firm Firm-Year 
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Table EA7: Exclusion of Firms with Financial Assets 
This table estimates regressions at the worker level. The dependent variable is binary variable equal to one 
if the worker leaves the firm in period t and receives unemployment benefits afterwards, and zero 
otherwise. We exclude workers from the sample who work for firms that have financial assets on their 
balance sheets. Shock (large) is an exchange rate shock. "Large" refers to shocks of larger appreciations, 
within the 20% highest appreciation quantile within a year, but also in the 50% highest appreciation 
quantile for the whole sample. Constrained is a categorical variable equal to 1,2,3 (1=best rating, 3=worst 
rating). Short-tenured is a dummy equal to one for workers with 0 to 2 years of tenure, and zero otherwise. 
Polynomial indicates a polynomial of order 12 of the running variable “risk forecast”. Sources: SCB LISA, 
UC AB, Bolagsverket. *** p<0.01 ** p<0.05 * p<0.1. 
Fired Next Year 
(1) (2) 
Short-tenure                 0.067*** 0.071*** 
                          (0.001) (0.001) 
Shock (large) 0.012*** - 
                          (0.001) - 
Short-tenure X Shock (large) -0.024*** -0.031*** 
                          (0.001) (0.001) 
Constrained -0.004*** - 
                          (0.001) - 
Short-tenure X Constrained 0.005*** 0.005*** 
                          (0.000) (0.000) 
Shock (large)=1 X Constrained -0.003*** - 
                          (0.000) - 
Short-tenure X Shock (large)=1 X Constrained 0.007*** 0.008*** 
                          (0.001) (0.001) 
Observations              
                 
5,742,486  
               
5,742,486  
Polynomials Yes No 
Industry-Year fixed effects Yes Yes 
Firm fixed effects Firm Firm-Year 
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EA.3. Impact of UC Ratings on Interest Rates paid 
It is useful to quantify the impact of changes in UC ratings on the interest rate paid 
by firms to put in perspective the size of the employment results. There are several useful 
measurements that help measuring or bounding the effect. 
The first approach to measure the marginal change in interest rates is directly from 
the Panel A of Table A3. In columns (7), (8) and (9) we report the change in the average 
interest rate paid when firms experience a contemporaneous change in rating. The change 
is measured at the boundary of a rating change by introducing a polynomial of order 12 
on the running variable. The results show an average change of 0.156% (15 basis points) 
for both boundaries 0.082% for the gold to silver boundary (not statistically significant) 
and 0.299% for the silver to bronze boundary. These are changes on the average interest 
rates after an unexpected (marginal) change in rating. Given that firms may have some 
long-term debt, the effect on the marginal interest rate should be higher.  
Alternatively, one can recourse to a risk neutral valuation to measure, or place some 
bounds, on the effect of ratings on interest rates. Consider the following expression in 
which a bond of a given rating c has an expected return Re: 
(1+rc) (1-pc) + (1+rc) pc Rc = Re 
Where rc is the promised rate on the debt, pct is the default probability and Rc is 
the recovery rate in case of default. To populate this expression, we can use as default 
probabilities, the average default probability in each interval (0.12% for gold, 0.47% for 
silver, and 1.59 for bronze), as recovery rate 35% (see Thorburn, 2000) and an expected 
return of 6%. This yields promised rates of 6.08% for gold, 6.32% for silver and 7.11% 
for bronze. That is, a yield differential of 24 basis points for the gold-silver transition and 
78 basis points for the silver-bronze boundary. If we assume a zero recovery rate, the 
differential grows to 37 basis points and 121 basis points respectively. 
 
 
 
